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I. Introduction: 
»On Behalf Of Humanity!«  
 
In 1915 and 1916, at the height of World War I, the American ambassador in 
Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau Sr., struggled with his superiors in 
Washington to draw attention to an event taking place at the periphery of the 
European continent, in the shadow of the great battles: the attempt of the 
Ottoman Empire‘s government to exterminate the Armenian population living 
on Turkish territory. Reports from consular offices, missionary sources as 
well as from Armenians who had just escaped the massacres had convinced 
the ambassador that a »race murder« of unknown dimensions was going on in 
the country; the notion of »genocide« had not yet been invented. And he had 
come to the conclusion that the only way to stop violence from spreading 
further was by intervention of a third party. 
 
I.1. The problem: Systematic failure to intervene in genocidal killings 
Being well aware of the fact that no genuine U.S.-American interests were 
threatened by the killing of Armenians in the distant Ottoman Empire, he 
beseeched Washington‘s foreign policy makers to act »on behalf of  
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humanity«. Yet, this appeal to a universal ethics went unheard. The 
government of President Wilson stuck to previously formulated policy 
commitments: it was determined to maintain a neutral position in what was 
considered to be a European conflict (Power, 2003, 4-11). 
Desperate about his impotence, Morgenthau left Constantinople in early 1916. 
Later, he commented that retreat:  
»My failure to stop the destruction of the Armenians had made 
Turkey for me a place of horror – I had reached the end of my 
resources.« (cited in Power, 2003, 10).  
The moral imperative to act, the sense of urgency had been defeated by the 
blunt considerations of realpolitik.  
After the end of World War II, the creation of a number of international 
institutions and organisations, most importantly the United Nations, as well as 
the evolution and expansion of international law carried the promise that 
henceforth there would be a permanent structure to co-ordinate and arbitrate 
national interests for the good of humanity. Those structures were set-up in 
response to the experience of the military, economic and humane disasters of 
the two World Wars and the economic crisis of the inter-war-period. No more 
should the interests of »humanity« be sacrificed to national policy goals. 
Some of those institutional and organisational structures, for example in the 
fields of trade and finance or in European co-operation, became great 
successes – at least by their own goals. Yet, when it comes to humanitarian 
crises, like the one experienced by Morgenthau in 1915, the existence of 
structures of transnational co-operation and arbitration seems to have changed 
but little on the ground. The U.S.-American Ambassador was not the last to 
despair about the non-responsiveness of his superiors to a human catastrophe 
he stood witness to: 
In spring 1994, Roméo Dallaire, a Canadian commander in charge of the U.N. 
peacekeeping mission in Rwanda urged for a reinforcement of his troops; for 
more than ten weeks, his requests were denied, as the corpses of those killed  
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by genocidal violence piled around him, and a medially globalised public 
watched in shock. About a year later, in July 1995, the Dutch commander 
Thomas Karremans, empty-handedly stood witness to the killing of 8,000 
Bosnian boys and men in Srebrenica, the U.N. »safe area« he had been in 
charge to secure; his demands for NATO-reinforcements and the requests for 
a modification of the peacekeeper‘s mandate went unheard. 
 
I.2. The research question:  
How to explain the failure of international organisations in genocidal 
crises? 
To the common sense, the hesitating attitude of the multinational bodies in 
dealing with an occurring genocide is stupefying. As controversial as U.N. 
interventions have become, moral intuition tells that if there exists one case 
where the need for intervention should be totally clear, where basic human 
rights should indisputably be enforced, it is the case of genocide. The reason 
is that genocides are political processes, in which pre-political attributes of 
persons – skin color, cultural identity, social status – to unilaterally divide a 
society in »us« and »them« and to attack the latter group.
1 Thus, genocidal 
violence targets a more or less defined aggregate of people, but not an 
organised group. »Membership« (cf. Luhmann, 1975; Luhmann, 1998, 826-
847) does not result from choice, but from birth or chance. Hence, this 
»group« is not endowed with the organisational capacity to respond quickly to 
a violent political attack. In such a situation, the only way to stop violence 
from spreading is the intervention of a third (cf. Sofsky, 1996, 72-90). 
In this thesis, I want to explore the repeated failure of the existing 
international institutions and organisations to set up intervention missions to 
                                                 
1  Scholars who explicitly treat genocides as political processes initiated deliberately 
to achieve certain political ends are not numerous, see for example Bauman, 1993;  
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stop an ongoing genocide. The research question is: why, despite the existence 
international organisations and unambiguous provisions in international law, 
why, in spite of what moral intuition and the logic of genocidal violence 
suggest, interventions to stop genocides from happening or from spreading 
fail to take place? And are there alternative to this situation? 
The central argument brought forward is that due to the constitutional 
dilemmas of international organisations, such as the United Nations or similar 
regional bodies, decision-making on crisis interventions does not take place in 
function of the judicial statutes of the respective organisations, but in function 
of political interests in the respective member states. Based on Mancur 
Olson‘s considerations about collective action in small groups, it is argued 
that decisive for the actual set-up of an intervention mission is the decision of 
the most important group member, in our case, the United States of America. 
Put differently, international interventions are bartered upon on domestic 
political markets. The outcome of this decision-making process is dependent 
upon three variables: first, political commitments made beforehand; second, 
the opportunity costs of the intervention, and third, the degree of public 
awareness to the crisis. 
 
I.3. The conceptual approach: New Institutional Economics 
In this thesis, the problem of third party intervention into genocidal crises will 
be explored in the theoretical framework of New Institutional Economics, in 
particular Public Choice and Constitutional Economics.
2 This approach 
focuses on institutional arrangements, i.e. systems of rules and mechanisms of 
rule enforcement as well as on processes of decision making. Accordingly, 
transnational co-operation has become an important issue within the NIE 
                                                                                                                                                    
DeFigueidredo Jr,Weingast, 1999. 
2  For a general introduction into the research area of NIE see Richter, 2005,  
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research agenda. For some time, however, research in this field has been 
focussed on the study of institutional arrangements in the field of economic 
cooperation, such as. This is partly due to the fact that some of the most 
influential theoretical writings in NIE have come from economists (see for 
example North, 1981; North, 1990), and have found their primary audience 
within the discipline. The dynamics has been further enhanced by the 
proliferation of market oriented economic systems on a global scale after the 
end of the Cold War. Being a neoclassical theory, NIE has been particularly 
apt to analyse these newly emerging structures.  
In principle, however, the analytical instruments of NIE should be also 
applicable to other institutional arrangements in other fields policy making, 
such as security. Pioneering works in this field stem from the Cold War 
period, when researchers such as Schelling or Kronman conceptualised the 
strategic interdependencies in a world divided by the Iron Curtain (Schelling, 
1960; Schelling, 1966; Kronman, 1985). Those works already forbore a 
tendency that should become most important in NIE research in the years to 
come: a rapprochement of  institutional research and game theory.
3 This 
approach has been particularly fruitful when it comes to the analysis of 
institutions in an evolutionary perspectives. Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 
for example, have used this approach in their work about the rational design 
of international institutions (Koremenos, Lipson,Snidal, 2001). Another 
interesting example are the works of Peter Bennett who expands game 
theoretical models to allow for the integration of important missing 
dimensions, such as differing perspectives, conflict dynamics and linked 
issues (Bennett, 1995).
4 Along with the classical writings in New Institutional 
                                                                                                                                                    
especially chapters 6 and 9. 
3 Andrew  Schotter‘s  The Economic Theory of Social Institutions (Schotter, 1981) is 
usually considered as the seminal in this regard (cf. Richter, 2005).  
4  Together with Howard, Bryant and Bradley, he developed drama theory, an 
enlargement of game theoretical models that avoid the banalising connotation of game 
theory and call for greater complexity in the analysis of strategic interdependencies, 
incorporating for example emotions or the strategic use of arguments (Howard, Bennett et  
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Economics, those works provide important elements in the reconstruction of 
decision making on international crisis intervention.  
Against the background of these theoretical consideration, the research 
question laid out in I.2 might be specified. We can now ask: what are the 
institutional structures and the decision-making processes in which decisions 
about interventions in humanitarian crises take place and why do they fail?   
 
I.4. The central case study: genocide in Rwanda 1994 
Although the research question is put generally, the considerations of this 
thesis are based on one central case study: the genocidal killings in Rwanda 
1994. The main reason for this choice is that the case is so well documented. 
Since it was the first incident of systematic large-scale killings after the end of 
Cold War, it stimulated the interest of researchers and policy makers alike, 
leading to a large corpus on academic and non-academic literature on the 
issue, including collections of eye-witness accounts (see I.5). 
The genocidal killings in spring 1994 started after the crash of the presidential 
airplane, on April 6. At about 8.30 pm, the plane had been coming low to 
Kigali airport for landing. It came from Dar-es-Salam, where the president 
had been participating at a meeting of several east African presidents and 
ministers. Although the summit had been officially dedicated to discussing 
the instable situation in Rwanda’s neighboring country, Burundi, during the 
day the interest of the participants had been drawn to the even more 
precarious situation in Rwanda. The Rwandan president, Juvénal 
Habyarimana, had been urged by his colleagues – and this not for the first 
time – to finally undertake serious actions to implement the Arusha peace 
agreement which had been signed in August 1993 to put an end to three years 
of civil war in his country. On his flight home, he had been accompanied 
                                                                                                                                                    
al., ).    
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Burundi’s President Cyprien Ntaryamira who’s plane was much slower and 
who had gratefully accepted a lift (Prunier, 1995, 210). 
Suddenly, two missiles had been fired from just outside the airport perimeter. 
The Falcon crashed into the garden of Habyarimana’s residence and 
immediately burst into flames, killing all aboard . At 9.15 pm, there were 
roadblocks throughout the city, manned by members of the militia 
interahamwe, houses were being searched (Prunier, 1995, 211, 223), and it 
had begun what should enter the records of world history as Africa’s very 
own version of the Holocaust. 
Although, in the West the Rwandan genocide is often depicted as an “African 
tribal slaughter”, it had been, from its early hours, a conflict of international 
dimension. Rwandan violence of spring 1994 did confine itself neither to 
Rwandan nationals nor to Rwandan territory, and generated human casualties 
and other burdens to third parties. Hence, it did not take long until the events 
in the east African country caught international attention – and immediately 
the claim was in the air that “something has to be done about that.” But for 
more than two months, it seemed that nothing happened at all. At least 
nothing that would have saved the people threatened by genocidal violence 
from being killed. Between April and June 1994, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted four resolutions concerning the escalated Rwandan conflict. 
But the first one did practically pull-out the peacekeeping force UNAMIR 
which had been in the country since September 1993, and it was only in the 
third one that the U.N. decision-making body even acknowledged that what 
was going on in the African country was a genocide.  
But the United Nations were not the only organisation to consider the 
Rwandan events. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) undertook efforts 
to set up a mediating mission, headed by the South African President Nelson 
Mandela, but the project did not take of the ground. News media showed 
pictures of mutilated bodies and of people on the run, NGO activists in the  
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field and parliamentarians in different countries showed – as Morgenthau had 
done eighty years before – their desperation. And while the international and 
regional decision making bodies busied themselves with debates about what 
should be done, who should do it and, most importantly, who would be going 
to foot the bill, the corpses in Rwanda piled to heaven. 
Finally, on June 22, more than ten weeks after the assassination of the 
Rwandan President had launched the mass killings, the United Nations 
Security Council authorized Opération Turquoise, a French led humanitarian 
intervention mission. Already the next day, the troops entered the country and 
started to establish a “save zone” within which 12-15,000 lives are estimated 
to have been saved (Klinghoffer, 1998, 88). 
During spring and summer 1994, between 800,000 and 850,000 people were 
killed in Rwanda. Eleven percent of the population. Most of them belonged to 
the minority group of the Tutsi. Nevertheless, there was a considerable 
number (10-30,000) of Hutu, the majority group, who were killed because 
they had shown in one way or another disagreement with extremist politics 
(Prunier, 1995, 265). Of the minority Tutsi, hardly ten percent survived spring 
and summer 1994. The daily killing rate of the Rwandan genocide was at 
least five times that of the Nazi extermination camps (Prunier, 1995, 261); for 
more than two weeks, RPF soldiers camping on the Rwandan-Tanzanian 
border counted one body per minute floating down the Akagera river towards 
Lake Victoria (Prunier, 1995, 262).
5 
 
I.5. The data basis   
For the reconstruction of the the events in Rwanda in spring 1994 as well as 
                                                 
5  In an interview with a French newspaper, the soldier testified that since he and his 
comrades had arrived there, on April 22, they had counted one body per minute, and that 
only the day before the interview, the flow had slowed down to 500 bodies per day  
10 
of the decision-making process about this issue primary as well as secondary 
sources have been consulted. The most important primary sources are 
documents issued by the United Nations as well as various bodies of the 
United States‘ government, which permit insights in the decision making 
process. For the reconstruction of the events on the ground, I had to rely on 
secondary sources, most importantly a collection of eyewitness accounts 
gathered by the London-based NGO African Rights (Rights, 1995) as well as 
newspaper articles. This reading has been complemented by academic 
literature, most importantly Gérard Pruniers meticulous account of the events 
(Prunier, 1995). 
 
I.6. Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: the subsequent chapter 
two  will provide an overview into the central case-study, the genocide in 
Rwanda 1994 and the reactions of the international organisations to this 
situation. In chapter three I will then introduce, the basic theoretical 
framework and propose a  theoretical model for the reconstruction of the 
decision-making process leading (or not) to humanitarian crisis interventions.  
Chapter four explores in some detail the political decision-making process in 
the U.S. in response to the genocidal killings in Rwanda. Chapter five then 
discusses this process in the light of the theoretical model introduced in 
chapter three. The thesis closes with a discussion of alternative institutional 
arrangements. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    




Brief Introduction to History and Society 
II.1. Pre-colonial cohabitation and colonial disruption 
Rwanda is situated in Eastern Africa, in the Highlands east of Lake Kivu. 7.8 
million people live, most of them as cattle or crop farmers, on a surface of 
only 26,000 square kilometers. This makes Rwanda the most densely 
populated state on the African continent. The country shows a particular 
pattern of settlement which evolved from its geophysical conditions. From its 
dominant and most populated landscape Rwanda has been derived the epithet 
of the country: »pays des mille collines — land of the thousand hills«. And it 
is the hill that constitutes the focus of social live. The hill is the scene for all 
social events transcending the boundaries of the family household, from 
marriages and other festivities to political meetings and the coordination of 
collective work. The hill also represents the frontier of rural solidarity 
(Prunier, 1995, 1-3; Marx, 1997). 
While spatially, the Rwandan society is organized around the unit of the hill, 
it became politically organized around the distinction between ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’. In pre-colonial Rwanda, ‘Hutu’ designated the group of crop farmers  
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who have always been the majority of the population, while ‘Tutsi’ referred to 
the cattle herders. The country was organized as a kingdom, with political 
power concentrated in the minority of the cattle herders. The king and most of 
the aristocracy belonged to this social group. But this distinction between 
farmers and cattle herders did not coincide with the spatial organisation of the 
society. Farmers and herders lived on the same hills, and — because 
intermarriage was not uncommon — belonged to the same families, 
households and clans. Until the turn of the 20
th century, contractual economic 
relationships based on mutual dependence (clientship relations) were frequent 
between members of both groups, and, at least until the proclamation of the 
first Rwandan Republic in 1961, there was a certain permeability between the 
groups. Marriage or social ascension could bring a family to give up their 
attachment to the ‘Hutu’ group and adopt a ‘Tutsi’ identity; it also happened 
vice versa. Thus, primarily, the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi did not 
describe ethnic categories — Rwandans share one language, one religion and 
one culture — but referred to social identities or roles determined by 
professional occupation, socio-political status and family lineage (African 
Rights, 1995, 2-5). 
This picture changed at the end of the 19
th century. Under the influence of 
Europeans, arriving in the country first as explorers, later as colonialists, it 
came to an ontologization of the beforehand functional social categories. 
Germans and Belgians brought with them the semantic of race, a highly 
popular scientific idea at this time, they introduced it as the pattern of 
description for the Rwandan society and applied it as the framework of their 
policies, giving way to a political ethnization of Rwandan society (Prunier, 
1995, 5-45). When the country gained its independence, in 1961, it proved 
that it had learned its lesson well.
6 While, usually, the moment of 
                                                 
6  For a comprehensive analysis on how the semantic introduced by the colonialist 
changed the reality of the Rwandan society see Marx, 1997.  
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independence of a former colony is represented as the liberation of the 
indigenous population from foreign domination, in Rwanda, it appeared — in 
consequence of the strategies played by the Belgian colonial power in retreat 
(Prunier, 1995, 44) — as the republican liberation of the ‘Hutu’-majority from 
the monarchic and unjust domination of the ‘Tutsi’-minority. While the 
eruption of an ethnic semantic is an element not uncommon in liberation 
movements, in Rwanda it took on a somewhat perverse form. Usually, this 
semantic is employed to strengthen the idea of national unity of the 
indigenous population, it is used to intensify the distinction between ‘us’ and 
›the rest of the world‹ (Nassehi, 1990, 274). But in Rwanda, it had a contrary 
effect. It confirmed, once and for all, the distinction between ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’ as the basic principle of political communication and action. In the 
Rwandan Republics
7 coming into live after the independence, political power 
was almost exclusively represented by members of the ‘Hutu’-group. A 
system of quota was enforced to secure a proportional representation (with 
regard to the population in total) of the two groups in public organisations and 
institutions, most importantly in civil services and in the education system. 
 
II.2. Radicalization of Politics and Civil War 
The first major violent confrontations between ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Hutu’ occurred 
between 1959 and 1962, during the so-called November Revolution, the event 
that entered Rwandan history as the moment of political emancipation of the 
majority-‘Hutu’. 20,000 ‘Tutsi’ are estimated to have been killed during this 
period, more than 220,000 fled to neighboring and some of them later to 
Western countries, creating a community of diaspora Rwandans, for most of 
whom exile lasted longer than 30 years. In 1963, the country witnessed a first 
                                                 
7  In the literature, it is distinguished between the First Republic under Grégoire  
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wave of massacres; the number of people killed then ranges between 14,000 
and 20,000 (Marx, 1997, 159-160). This renewed outbreak of violence 
intensified the ‘Tutsi’-exodus, and according to the UNHCR, in 1964, 
336,000 Rwandans lived in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Burundi, 
Tanzania and Zaire.
8 It is estimated that, due to population growth, by the 
early 1990s, the number had reached 600-700,000 (Prunier, 1995, 63).  
Many Rwandan refugees did hold on to the idea that they would return to 
their country, one day, and beginning in the late 1970s, political organisations 
emerged pursuing this goal. In 1987, an army, the Rwandese Patriotic Front, 
is created and put under the command of General Fred Rwigema.
9 It should 
be emphasized that, although the RPF originated from the community of 
exiled ‘Tutsi’, it was an opposition- rather than a ’Tutsi’-movement. From its 
early days, oppositional ‘Hutu’, either exiled themselves or still in the 
country, aligned with the RPF. On October 1, 1990, the RPF invades the 
country with the goal to overthrow the regime of President Juvénal 
Habyarimana, who, at this moment found himself already in a difficult 
political position. Due to internal conflicts and economic difficulties, his one-
party regime had become fragile, in the course of the late 1980s, internal 
opposition developed and gained in influence. Six days before the RPF 
attacked the country and initiated a civil war, Habyarimana, in an attempt to 
save his power, had convened a commission charged with the elaboration of a 
constitutional reform in order to introduce a multiparty system (Prunier, 1995, 
74-92; Marx, 1997, 161-162). 
The civil war lasts three years, during which the President not only struggles 
to defeat the RPF but also to accomplish the constitutional reform. The RPF 
attack acted as catalyst on the already tense situation. The political landscape 
                                                                                                                                                    
Kayibanda (1961-73) and the Second one under Juvénal Habyarimana (1978-90). 
8   UNHCR Banyarwanda Refugee Cencsus (1964), quoted in Prunier, 1995, 62. 
9  The foundation of this military force was possible because a considerable number  
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of the country was drifting apart. In late 1990 and early 1991, four 
independent parties are created, undermining the single-party system which, 
at this moment, is still officially protected by Article seven of the 1978 
Constitution (Prunier, 1995, 121-126). In the months to come, the formation 
of new political movements continued. This pluralization of the political 
arena was accompanied by an escalation of political conflicts. The civil war 
was grist to the mills of extremist movements. In March 1992, a radical 
‘Hutu’ racist party, the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), 
working even on the right of the government party, is created as the now 
eleventh independent party in the country. One year later, from the political 
circle of this latest offspring of “democracy” the journalists are recruited who 
should run Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), the radio 
station that became known during the genocide as the »vampire radio« calling 
for »Tutsi-blood« (Prunier, 1995, 128-129). Already in this civil war period, 
mass killings and assassinations of non-combatant members of the ‘Tutsi’ 
population and of moderate ‘Hutu’ occurred, echoing the growing influence 
of extremists in the political live and foreshadowing the events to come.
10 
On August 4, 1993, the Arusha peace agreement, named after the Tanzanian 
city hosting the negotiations, was signed in order to end the war after three 
years of fighting and more than one year of negotiations.
11 The agreement 
decreed the formation of a transitional multiparty government with 
                                                                                                                                                    
of exiled ‘Tutsi’ where military trained since they had served in the Ugandan army. 
10  About 300 members of the ‘Tutsi’ group were killed, on March 3, 1992, in the 
region of Bugesera, after Radio Rwanda broadcasted report according to which the 
advancing RPF planned the elimination of the ‘Hutu’-elite. On August 20, 1992, 
oppositional ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ are killed in Kibuye. On February 7 and 8, 1993, massacres 
of ‘Tutsi’ occurred in the Northwest of the country, which are responded to by the RPF 
with an retaliatory attack in the prefectures of Ruhengeri and Byumba (Marx, 1997, 164-
165). 
11   The final agreement has been preceded by a series of three accords: (1) July 1992, 
a cease fire accord between the Rwandan government and the RPF; (2) August 1992, an 
accord defining the constitutional foundations of the future Rwandan state; (3) January 
1993, an accord decreeing the formation of a transitional government with participation of  
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participation of the RPF until the end of 1993. In December, by resolution 
872, the U.N. Security Council deployed a peacekeeping mission of 2,700 
troops, to the country in order to support the transition process.
12 But the 
implementation of the Arusha accord did not come off the ground. On 
December 28, 1993, RPF politicians symbolically enter the parliamentary 
building, however, the formation of a regular government fails; the only 
person that is formally sworn into office is the old and new President, Juvénal 
Habyarimana, on whom international pressure is increasing demanding him to 
undertake serious steps towards a stabilization of his country.  
 
II.3. The Genocide 
The assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, the exact 
circumstances of which have never been entirely illuminated
13, generated an 
escalation of violence in the country. The bloodshed began in the capital of 
Kigali, and its first victims were carefully selected. Among them were the 
                                                                                                                                                    
the RPF  (Marx, 1997, 164-165). 
12  The UNAMIR (United Nation Assisstance Mission for Rwanda) force was 
commissioned »(a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali […]; (b) To monitor 
observance of the cease-fire agreement […]; (c) To monitor the security situation during 
the final period of the transitional government’s mandate, leading up to the elections; (d) 
To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes; (e) To investigate at 
the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with 
the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed 
forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as 
appropriate to the Secretary-General; (f) To monitor the process of repatriation of 
Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a 
safe and orderly manner; (g) To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance 
activities in conjunction with relief operations; (h) To investigate and report on incidents 
regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police« (Council, October 5, 1993, 2). 
13  The issue had been the object of many and sometimes wild speculations. What led 
to major confusions was the fact that the men who fired the missile on the plane have been 
white, which led some commentators to conclude that it had been agents of the former 
colonial power Belgium who were behind the assassination. Another, and a more plausible 
theory, claims that these men were mercenaries acting on behalf of political forces in the 
country that tried to prevent a democratization of the country.  
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Prime Minister in office, Agathe Uwilingiyimana; the president of the 
constitutional court, Joseph Kavaruganda; leaders of opposition parties like 
Landwald Ndasingwa (and his Canadian wife), leader of the democratic wing 
of the Parti Libéral, or Frédéric Nzamurambaho, chef of the Parti Social 
Démocrate; furthermore, known human rights activists like the businessman 
Charles Shamukiga or the journalist André Kamweya; as well as priests and 
clergymen at the Christus Center in Kigali who had publicly demanded a 
democratization of the country (Prunier, 1995, 230). These first acts of 
violence did not target ‘Tutsi’, but were selective assassinations of persons 
publicly known as being liberal and in opposition to the government in power. 
Most of them were belonged to the group of the ‘Hutu’. The execution 
commandos in the capital were headed by the Presidential Guard, 1,500 
armed men who managed to eliminate all ›priority targets‹ in the capital 
within thirty six hours.  
 
In the countryside, most of the victims died in large- or medium-scale 
massacres, organized everywhere in cooperation of the local or regional 
administration, the militia and the army. The weapon usually used was the 
machete, an agricultural tool of 45 to 65 centimeters with a wooden grip and a 
blunt metal blade; several hits are necessary to kill an adult man with this 
device. But contrary to the western representation of the Rwandan genocide 
as ‘wild slaughter’ and ‘unrestrained carnage’, the killing in the east African 
country was a highly organized process. It was usually coordinated by high 
ranking regional and local government officials who commanded the local 
police (gendarmerie) and the militia (interahamwe), instructed peasants to 
participate in the killings and were authorized to call for help upon the 





On April 8, 1994, two days after the genocidal killings had started, the RPF 
intervened in the northeastern prefecture of Byumba, with the declared goal 
of stopping the killings and — once more — overthrowing a violent 
government. In the following weeks, the army advances towards the interior 
of the country, seizing the capital Kigali on July 4, and the prefectures of 
Butare in the south and Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in the northwest during the 
same month.  
The Rwandan genocide was record-breaking in more than one sense. Not only 
did it produce a hallucinating number of people killed with relatively simple 
means within a time horizon of only four months. It also created one of the 
most dramatic waves of refugees the world has ever seen. With regard to their 
motives, the refugees can be divided into two different categories. The first 
group consisted of persons targeted by the genocidal killings, mainly ‘Tutsi’, 
who tried to escape the aggression by searching more secure places within the 
country or by fleeing across the borders, especially to Burundi. The second, 
much larger wave of refugees appears as the RPF advances into the interior of 
the country. It is composed of ‘Hutu’ fearing acts of violent retribution. On 
April 28 and 29, 1994, a quarter of a million of people cross the border to 
Tanzania, the UNHCR speaks of the largest and fasted exodus ever reported. 
In Benaco, 18 kilometers from the Rwandan border, the biggest refugee camp 
in the world raises (see Marx, 1997, 167). The progress of the RPF in the 
northwest of the country leads to a second mass exodus in the second half of 
July; within four days, 1.2 million people cross the border into the east-
Zairian region of Goma (Marx, 1997, 167). By the end of July, Rwanda had 
                                                 
14  Already in pre-colonial times, the Rwandan state developed a highly differentiated 
administrative system. The country was divided into eleven provinces (headed by a préfet), 
which were subdivided into communes (headed by a bourgmestre). Communes were 
divided into sectors (headed by a conseiller) and those again into cells (coordinated by a 
responsable), covering about ten family households (Jackson, s.a.).  
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not only lost almost ten percent of its population in genocidal killings, but 
another 60 percent of it were either refugees or displaced within the country.
15 
In summary, it can be said that the attentive observer watching to Rwanda in 
spring and summer 1994, would witness three concomitant (and interrelated) 
processes: First, the systematic killing of members of a minority group, 
mostly in large- and medium-scale massacres, as well as the assassination of 
oppositional politicians. Second, a civil-war type fight between an insurgent 
army and government troops. Third, a wave of people crossing the borders 
and trying to leave the country. 
 
After this sketch of the Rwandan events, I will now turn to the U.S.-American 
reaction to the crisis in the east-African country. 
 
                                                 
15  Refugees and displaced persons were distributed as follows (United States Congress. 
Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 1994): 
 
In Rwanda  RPF area  905,000 
  French “save area”  1,500,000 
In Neighboring Countries  Tanzania 475,000 
 Uganda  10,000 
 Zaire  1,400,000  
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 Burundi  117,300 
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III. With the Voter in Mind: 
An NIE Perspective on Crisis Interventions 
The claims to intervene into a genocidal crisis, as they are brought forward by 
NGO officials or news media, refer to an idealist conception of the United 
Nations and their action, a perspective that emphasizes the role of the U.N.-
organisation as a promoter of the interest of humanity and as a bulwark 
against national governments disrespecting those values. The United Nations 
are conceived as a late offspring of the Enlightenment, which had discovered 
the value of a human life and advanced the idea of the universality of human 
rights. They appear as an attempt to translate those philosophical ideas into 
the political realm. According to this perspective, the United Nations are the 
institutional expression of what is commonly called »the international 
community« that uses the organisation to emanate a kind of »general will« on 
a global level. 
The claim for international intervention into a genocidal crisis, as it is brought 
forward by NGO officials and news media and as it is suggested by moral 
intuition, echoes this idealist conception of the United Nations. It evokes the 
»responsibility« of the »international community« towards its »fellow 
humans«. The United Nations, as the incarnation of this community, is called 
upon to execute its will. In this perspective, the failure to set up an  
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intervention mission and to stop a genocide in progress appears as a 
dysfunctionality. 
As important this idealist perspective on the United Nations and its 
interventions into violent crises is as a regulative idea and as a prescriptive 
principle, as impotent it is as an analytical tool. Because »the international 
community« as a somehow homogeneous group emanating a common will in 
the bodies of the United Nations is a fiction. Yet, how can be conceive 
differently of these dynamics? To approach an answer to this question, I will, 
in the first section of this chapter, introduce an NIE perspective on politics. In 
the second section, I will then explore the particularities of international 
relations. Based on these considerations, I will then attempt, in the third 
section, to conceptually reconstruct decision-making on international crisis 
interventions.   
 
III.1. An NIE perspective on politics 
Maybe the most important contribution of liberal economic theory since 
Adam Smith has been to demonstrate that social welfare can emerge from the 
exchange between individuals who act upon purely selfish motives (Smith, 
Glahe, c1978, book IV, chapter 2). This perspective, however, has also 
stimulated inquiries into the conditions and limits of such socially beneficial 
exchanges. It is here that the neoclassical theory of the political finds its roots: 
in this perspective, politics essentially responds to the problem that not 
always the socially optimal solution will be achieved by individual and 
selfishly motivated exchanges. In those instances, cooperation is needed to 
approach the social optimum; public goods provision and prisoners‘ dilemma-
constellations are the examples most in point in this regard. Accordingly, in 
the neoclassical perspective facilitating socially beneficial cooperation is the 
central task and the basic justification for the existence of political institutions  
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(Mueller, 2003, 9-14). 
Initially, neoclassical thinking about politics has been elaborated with the 
state and its institutions as major reference point. In its most simple version 
the state is conceived as a contract between a ruler and her constituents. At 
the core of this contract is the trade of certain public goods, most importantly 
protection,
16 provided by the ruler in exchange for revenue provided by the 
constituents in the form of (compulsory) contributions. By virtue of this 
contract, the use of force is monopolised by the ruler, i.e. the institutions of 
the state, which become the supreme authority for the constituents. This 
contract increases social welfare as obtaining the public goods in question 
would be impossible or far more costly if provided by each individual herself. 
In its activities the ruler is constraint by the constituents ability to leave the 
respective constituency (»exit«) or to depose the current ruler and substitute 
her with a rival (»voice«). Within this concept, the main task of the state is to 
develop and enforce a constitution which defines the property rights of the 
constituents. In this context, property rights are broadly defined, including not 
only the ownership of physical objects, but  – in the tradition of Locke – also 
basic human rights such as the right to live, the right to self-determination or 
the right to nationhood (Richter, 2005, 89-90, 473, 475). 
Constitutionally democratic states can be conceived of as relational principal-
agent contracts with the constituents, i.e. he citizens, being the principal and 
the voted representatives the agent. As in any principal-agent constellation, 
commitment problems are at the core of the relationship: how can be 
guaranteed that the elected politicians (agents) do not ex post deviated from 
what has been ex ante agreed upon with the voters (principals) through the 
election process? Institutional arrangements play a decisive role in lending 
                                                 
16  Protection or security is always at the core of the neoclassical argument about the 
origins of the state. Depending on the author, other public goods may come into play; in 
North conception, for example, justice is the second public good provided by the ruler 
(North, 1981, 23).  
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credibility to commitments made by political institutions. Among those 
arrangements are not only formal institutions such as a codex of written 
fundamental rights (Grundrechtekatalog), but also informal institutions that 
are part, for example, of the organisational culture of certain government 
bodies (Richter, 2005, 473@476-473@482). 
The process of political decision-making itself can be understood as a series 
of transactions with the objective to change (part of) the institutional 
framework of a given social relationship (Richter, 2005, 473@486). In a 
constitutional democracy, competition between political parties is a driving 
force of this process. Accordingly, within the framework of NIE, the political 
process is commonly conceived in analogy to the market place:  
»Competition subjects politicians and political parties to the 
filter of the polling place, much as competitions  subjects 
managers to the filter of the market place.« (Demsetz, 1982, 68)  
Yet, differently from the realm of economics, where competition for 
economic advantages takes place on the basis of secure property rights, 
political competition is a struggle for an authority that includes the power to 
change these same property rights. Moreover, political competition is 
typically monopolistic competition. This means that strategic thinking and 
searching for alliances dominates the actions of political agents. Depending 
on the overall context, this might lead to frequent changes in the governing 
constellations as well as the institutional framework, as for example in Italy, 
or to apparent political stability which is achieved, as  for example in 
Germany, at the price of economic inefficiency (Richter, 2005, 473@482-
473@485).  
Having explored the basic concepts of politics within a single state, let us now 
turn to the sphere of international relations. 
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III.2. International relations in an NIE framework 
The basic concepts of NIE to describe politics in the international sphere do 
not vary much from the ones introduced to describe politics in a single state. 
There is, however, one major difference which lies in the nature of the 
subject: different from the nation state, where the ruler is the supreme 
authority, international relations do not know such a superior power which 
would guarantee an order. As each state is sovereign, it is an anarchical and 
self-organising systems with no supreme institution to enforce agreements. 
More than in contractual relationships in the context of the nation state, the 
efficiency of agreements depends on the ability to safeguard ex ante against 
opportunism ex post (Richter, 2005, 473@486-473@487). This can be done 
by ex ante safeguarding techniques as elaborated by Kronman (Kronman, 
1985)
17 or by a rational optimisation of membership and voting rules within 
international organisations with regard to the desired outcome (Koremenos, 
Lipson,Snidal, 2001).  
Within this conceptual framework, the United Nations Organisation does not 
appear as the arbiter of the »interest of humanity«, as it does in the idealist 
perspective and in the discourses based on this view. Instead it must be 
conceived as an organisation composed of sovereign states whose operational 
principle is the strategic interplay between the interests brought forward by 
the member countries. Deliberation and decision-making processes — and 
this is true for the United Nations as it is for the European Union and any 
other organisation assembling several states — do not take place in an open 
space. They are necessarily structurally coupled to political processes in the 
member countries.
 In many cases, this interdependency is part of the 
organisation‘s constitution wherever the latter explicitly prescribes a political 
ratification of constitutional or even operational decisions on the national 
level. The U.N. Charter, for example, demands that any commitment of 
                                                 
17  Kronman describes four of those safeguarding techniques: hostage taking,  
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military troops to U.N. missions  
»shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.« 
(United Nations Organisation, 1948, ch. VII, art. 43, sec. III) 
In consequence, the failure to meet a goal formulated in the U.N.-Charter or 
in one of the numerous conventions – as it occurred in the Rwandan case – is 
not a dysfunctionality in the proper sense of the word, but, on the contrary, 
the direct outcome of the functional principles of the organisation.  
The U.N. is thus faced with a constitutional dilemma which is at the origin of 
the organisation’s inability to meet its goals: being the only voluntary 
organisation comprising nearly all recognised states on this planet, the U.N. 
is, on the one hand, the only political organisation which could legitimately 
act on a global level. Yet, on the other hand, decision making within this 
organisation responds not primarily to its founding judicial principles, but is 
dependend upon the actions of its member states. 
Against the background of this general considerations, let us explore in the 
following how this structure affects decision making on crisis interventions. 
 
III.3. A NIE approach to international crisis interventions 
Genocides are destructive processes striking at the spiritual and physical 
foundations of a society. Moreover, genocides can destabilize entire regions, 
not only because of the political disruption in the country, but also because 
they generate waves of refugees that create burdens to third-party countries. 
Therefore, from the perspective of regional or global social welfare, actions to 
prevent or stop genocide are always desirable not only to the threatened 
population in the country but also to third parties outside of it. 
Once an intervention is launched, its (beneficial) effects can be enjoyed by 
                                                                                                                                                    
collaterals, hands tying and union building (Kronman, 1985, 12-21).  
27 
everyone, exclusion being technically impossible. Moreover, the results of the 
intervention – in general non-violent regional stability and the economic and 
political options it provides – can be enjoyed by an infinite number of people. 
Expressed in terms of economic theory, the outcome of a U.N. authorized and 
coordinated intervention into  a genocidal crisis can be conceived as a 
collective good.
18 It has to be emphasised, however, that the good is not the 
intervention itself but the outcome it generates.
19 The intervention has to be 
conceived of as the costs of obtaining the collective good. 
For a long time, sociological group theory as well as economic theory has 
assumed that the provision of collective goods occurs in an almost natural 
way, by rational agents noticing that in acting together they can not only save 
costs but realise gains that never could be achieved in acting alone; collective 
water supply systems and police corps as well as labor unions, political 
parties and lobbying organisations were among the classical examples for this 
type of goods. It was the American economist Mancur Olson who, in its 
seminal work The Logic of Collective Action (1965) (Olson, 1965), 
challenged this hypothesis. Why, he asked, if once a collective good is 
provided and no one can be excluded from its consumption, should anyone 
contribute to its provision in the first place? Everybody could wait for others 
to provide the good and then freeride on their efforts. Olson’s favorite 
example were labor unions which negotiate wage increases that become 
effective for all workers of an industry, regardless of their membership in the 
union.  
Olson emphasized that in deciding whether a collective good will be provided 
or not, the decisive unit is not the collective, but – as in the provision of 
                                                 
18  According to neoclassical economic theory, non-excludability and non-rivalry in 
consumption are the standard criteria for a collective good (see for example 
Cornes,Sandler, 1996). 
19  It goes without saying that there are always profiteers of the mass killings. To them 
the intervention will appear rather as a »bad«, as a cost imposed upon their behavior, a 
negative externality.  
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private goods – the individual. He pointed out that it does not suffice that 
everyone in the collective gains somehow from the provision of the collective 
good, but that it must be rational for an individual member to invest in the 
provision. Olson shows that, rather than being »the natural thing to happen«, 
the production of collective goods must be considered as the exceptional case, 
since usually organisations and associations will have to invent an 
institutional structure furnishing incentives to engage in the production of the 
good (cf. Olson, 1965, 22-36).  
Olson suggests, and this is the major insight of his work, that the problem of 
collective goods provision stems from the fact that, although everyone profits 
from a collective good, everyone profits to a different degree. For example, 
although all property owners are better off with a property tax rebate, the 
benefit is more significant to owners of large fortunes than it is to owners of 
only modest properties. Olson shows that the fraction an individual member 
of the group holds in the expected group gain in relation to the cost of its 
provision will determine whether or not, and if yes to which extent, an 
individual player will engage in the production of the good (Olson, 1965, 23-
24).  
While traditional theories of group behavior focus exclusively on the size of 
the overall group gain, Olson’s work emphasizes that the decisive factor is the 
size of the fraction of that gain going to an individual group member. The 
larger and the more homogeneous the group, the more trivial that fraction 
tends to be, which is why the production of collective goods is difficult in 
those cases. Although in small groups it is more likely that the provision of a 
collective good can be realised, another difficulty occurs. There might be 
players holding fractions large enough to invest in the production of a certain 
amount of the collective good, regardless of what her fellow group members 
are doing. In those cases it is likely that the good will be provided only by the 
member(s) holding large fractions of the group gain, although the outcome for  
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the group could be increased if members with smaller fractions also made 
their contribution. Small groups therefore tend to a suboptimal provision of 
collective goods.
20  
Olson remarks that a more detailed analysis of small group behavior of the 
kind just outlined »could help to explain the apparent tendency for large 
countries to bear disproportionate shares of the burdens of multinational 
organisations, like the United Nations and NATO, and could help to explain 
some of the popularity of neutralism among smaller countries« (Olson, 1965, 
36). In this vein, I will in the following use his model to explore decision-
making on international crisis interventions. 
Against the background of Olson‘s conception, we have to reformulate once 
more the problem of U.N. authorised international interventions into 
genocidal crises. The question is no longer, how the international decision-
making body, such as the U.N. Security Council decides upon the issue; 
instead the focus shifts to individual member states, especially to the most 
powerful ones. To understand, why the U.N. decides to intervene in a 
genocidal crisis, we have to understand how the most powerful member 
countries in the Security Council come to a decision on this issue. In the 
historical context of 1994, this most powerful member was indisputable the 
United States.  
Rational politicians in this country will decide upon the intervention 
considering the ratio between its costs and the expected gains. They will 
assess those parameters from a domestic perspective. This means that relevant 
to their decision-making are only those costs and gains which occur to their 
constituents and in consequence to themselves. The fate of the people targeted 
by the genocide or other third-party agents play a role only in so far as they 
affect the domestic constituency. 
                                                 
20  Olson, 1965, 27-29. He calls this dynamic a »systematic tendency for ‘exploitation’ 
of the great by the small” (Olson, 1965, 29, italics in the original).  
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From the perspective of a single government, the economic costs of the 
intervention are the efforts that have to be undertaken and the resources that 
have to be employed to contribute to the U.N. mission. Usually, the size of 
this contribution will be chosen voluntary. Only for permanent members of 
the Security Council, the financial constitution of the United Nations 
stipulates mandatory shares; for the United States, for example, the obligatory 
contribution is fixed in mid-term at 31.7 percent of all peacekeeping costs.  
The economic gains from the intervention are the prevention of damage to the 
interest of domestic constituents, be it the damage to their capital or their 
lives. This negative formulation (which is due to the destructive character of 
the genocidal process and the restorative intention of the intervention) points 
to the fact that the size of the possible gain, depends upon the involvement of 
the domestic constituency in the conflict country prior to the genocide. As it 
is outlined by Olson, a government assessing those costs and gains would 
promote the establishment of an intervention force in the Security Council, if 
its expected individual gain from the operation were large enough to exceed 
the expenditures necessary to set it up the mission; it then would, if it should 
become necessary, carry the financial burden alone.  
But things are not this simple, since a government operating under the rules of 
a representative democratic political regime cannot confine its considerations 
to the economic profits or losses of an intervention. Its main interest will be in 
the effects of these economic parameters in the political realm. A government 
will explore which political gains and losses – in terms of votes secured/won 
or votes lost – the intervention might create. Three factors are decisive in 
determining how the economic parameters are translated into the political 
sphere.  
The first factor is the political opportunity costs of a government’s 
participation in the international intervention. The more intensely a 
government becomes involved in dealing with the genocidal conflict, the less  
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resources – attention, money, time – are available to deal with other societal 
or political issues and problems that might seem important to its constituency. 
This neglect might lead to a loss of votes in those parts of the constituency 
holding significant stakes in the neglected policy field.  
The second important factor which affects the pure economic reasoning is the 
importance of policy commitments which have been made prior to the 
genocidal crisis. Three different categories might be relevant. The first 
category comprises commitments that have been made with regard to the 
country in which now the crisis occurs, for example an openly expressed 
alliance with the government or with oppositional forces, but also a thread to 
intervene if certain conditions in a country prevail. A second category are 
commitments concerning general foreign policy strategies, for example a 
commitment to neutrality or isolationism. The third one is associated to the 
opportunity costs of the intervention. It consists of commitments concerning 
actions in other policy fields that might be endangered by an intense 
involvement in the foreign crisis. In a representative democratic system, the 
commitment to certain policy strategies is the basis upon which a government 
comes into power. Faithfulness or unfaithfulness to commitments of the first 
and second category primarily affect the credibility of the government, for 
commitments of the third category not only general credibility but also the 
votes of constituents holding stakes in the policy field the commitment had 
been made to are at stake. The importance of antecedent policy commitments 
in deciding whether or not to support an intervention mission should not be 
underestimated. Genocides, as the ones occurred in Rwanda and ex-
Yugoslavia, demand quick responses. There is no time for broad societal 
debates or convincing the constituency of one strategy or another. That is why 
governments generally will be inclined to deduct their position from historic 
facts, i.e. to stick to political guidelines, strategies or principles already 
formulated.  
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The third factor acting upon the pure economic parameters of the decision is 
the degree of public awareness of the genocidal crisis. It was the U.S.-
American political scientist Elmar Schattenschneider who pointed out that the 
outcome of a political conflict is influenced by the degree to which the 
conflict is socialised (Schattenschneider, 1960; see also Miller, 1993). The 
less attention the genocidal conflict gets as an issue in the domestic public, 
the less significant will be the political costs or gains that might arise from an 
intervention into the conflict. Politicians are free to decide in order to satisfy 
certain particular interest but also free not to decide at all. But as soon as the 
domestic public becomes aware of the conflict, politicians will politically gain 
or lose by acting or not acting, the stake rises proportionally to the increase of 
public attention.  
Yet, awareness to the genocidal crisis only evolves once the genocide has 
begun and enters the domestic agenda. Contrary to the other parameters of 
decision-making introduced so far, the scope of this factor can hardly be 
assessed in advance. Moreover, public awareness is a manipulable factor. By 
strategically distributing information, public attention can be directed and 
attentiveness increased; by strategically withholding information, it might be 
possible to prevent the development of public awareness and the formation of 
an »issue«. Government agents as well as the political opposition or civil 
society movements can take advantage of this manipulability in order to 
pursue their organisational goals. In this sense, the genocide enters the 
domestic political arena as »political issue« as any other. But public 
awareness is not only a manipulable variable, but also a function of time, 
since public attentiveness cannot be sustained over extended periods. As 
important as an issue might appear in the first place, it will undergo a cycle in 
which after having reached a peak level, attention will fall and eventually 
come back to a (near) zero level (cf. Downs, 1972). 
The implications of this analysis of the problem of intervention can be  
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summarised as follows: an international intervention into a genocidal crisis 
can be conceived of as the provision of a collective good; the organisational 
process of setting up a mission exhibits the typical problems of collective 
goods production in small groups which usually leads to a suboptimal 
outcome. A government of a U.N. member country represented in the 
Security Council and faced with the decision of whether or not to support an 
intervention mission will evaluate its expected political and economic costs 
and benefits. According to Mancur Olson’s theory of small groups, a 
government will support the mission as soon as its individual gain from the 
operation exceeds the costs of setting up the intervention force, regardless of 
the size of the contribution of other member countries. The basic cost of the 
intervention is the individual countries contribution of financial and/or other 
resources to the U.N. mission. The size of the gain a country can expect 
primarily depends upon the economic and political involvement of 
constituents in the conflict country prior to the genocide. The more extensive 
this involvement had been and the more significant the interests of 
constituents in this country, the greater the incentive to the government to act 
in order to protect those interest (and to secure the associated votes). But the 
ratio of those basic costs and gains is affected by factors in the domestic 
political environment. Political opportunity costs and the threat of loosing the 
associated votes increase the overall costs of the intervention and reduce the 
expected net-profit of an intervention. Policy commitments made prior to the 
genocidal crisis, which usually reflect preferences of the constituency, might 
narrow the options a government can chose without losing credibility and the 
votes associated to actions in certain policy fields. Public awareness to the 
genocidal conflict magnifies the political consequences of the government’s 
decision. It increases the probability of being punished by the voters for 
undertaking unpopular measures as well as the probability of being rewarded 
for a succeeded mission which has been supported by the constituency. 
In the remainder of this thesis, I will adopt this perspective to explore the  
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belated intervention into the genocidal crisis in Rwanda in spring 1994. Since 
the analysis of the domestic policy positions of all U.N. member countries 
that where party to the decision-making would be far beyond the scope of this 
paper, I will confine myself to the study of the largest member country, the 
United States. In the following chapter four, I will explore the reaction in the 
United States to the events in Rwanda in spring 1994. Chapter five will then 
provide an interpretation of the events in the light of the theoretical model 
introduced in section III.3. 
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IV. A Show At No Risk: 
The U.S. and the Escalation of the Rwandan Conflict 
The plane crash on April 6, 1994 and the subsequently fast-spreading killings 
demanded a quick response from all governments with some involvement in 
Rwanda. The U.S. government acted in three steps to the escalation of the 
Rwandan conflict: first, it evacuated U.S. nationals from the country; second, 
it engaged, in preventing a U.N. military intervention; in a third step, the U.S. 
government became engaged in providing humanitarian relief to refugees who 
had sought shelter in Rwanda‘s neighbouring countries. In the following I 
will trace these successive steps, starting with an overview of U.S. politics 
towards Rwanda prior to spring 1994. 
 
IV.1. Guerillas in the Mist: The Pre-Genocidal Period 
Prior to the genocide, the minuscule east African country of Rwanda was no 
issue to the U.S.-American public. It had a meaning only to a handful of 
Africa-specialists, to zoologist specialized in the study of primates and maybe 
to travel agents organizing off-mainstream safari trips. At the end of the 
1980s, Hollywood had helped the region to some popularity, when Michael 
Apted’s movie “Gorillas in the Mist” (1988), starring Sigourney Weaver,  
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draw attention to the fact that a rare, fascinating and endangered species of 
mountain gorillas lived on this spot on earth. Tourism had profited from this 
sudden interest of the West in the Rwandan highlands. But the curiosity was 
short lived and the country almost forgotten again by the mid-1990s. The 
involvement of the United Nations in the country following the signature of 
the Arusha peace-agreement brought Rwanda back to the foreign affairs 
pages of national newspapers, but reporting remained fragmentary, notes 
written for an already informed public or extremely vulgarized 
representations of the Rwandan conflicts. To somebody unfamiliar with the 
historical background of the events, the articles appearing in U.S.-American 
newspapers provided a diffuse image of just another African region the most 
outstanding characteristics of which seems to be its astounding natural beauty 
and its persistent violence. Headlines like »Seeking Gorillas Among 
Guerrillas«
21, mirror this strange and eclectic image of Rwanda in the U.S. 
(and in the West in general), as well as articles reporting about the conflict as 
most of all a danger to the wildlife in the country: 
»Rwandan combatants signed a peace accord today, ending 
nearly three years of civil war in their tiny central African 
nation. The conflict spilled into national park preserves, and 
troops apparently killed some of the rare mountain gorillas and 
nearly wiped out tourism, which had grown significantly after 
the movie ›Gorillas in the Mist‹.« (“Accord Ends 3-Year Civil 
War in Rwanda”, August 5, 1993) 
But being uniformed and unaware of the political conflicts in Rwanda or even 
of the existence of this country was not only a state of mind of the U.S.-
American public, but also of many of its foreign policy officials and 
bureaucrats. Pentagon staff officers are quoted to have been asking »Is it Hutu 
and Tutsi or Tutu and Hutsi?« when they learned about the assassination of 
the Rwandan president  (quoted in Power, 2003). As the Belgian foreign 
minister remembers, the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, first took out 
a map to locate the east-African country, when Claes had come to discuss the 
                                                 
21  Hammer, July 19, 1993; this article appeared in the live-style section of the journal.  
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Rwandan issue with him. The tiny bit of expertise on Rwanda was 
concentrated in the least influential segments of the U.S.-American political 
system. Some low-ranking U.S. intelligence analysts were keenly aware of 
the hazardous situation in the east-African country. A CIA report of January 
1993 warned of the likelihood of large-scale ethnic violence. A study of 
December 1993 indicated that 40 million tons of small arms had been 
transferred from Poland to Rwanda, a suspiciously huge quantity for a 
country implementing a peace accord (Organisation of African Unity, 2000, 
ch. 9). But these information were only another two reports among a vast 
number of intelligence news published daily, and did not provoke any action 
in U.S. government agencies. The probably best-informed American observer 
of the Rwandan events was the historian and human rights activist, Alison 
Des Forges, a board member of Human Rights Watch, who had tried to draw 
the attention of U.S. foreign policy officials to the events in the country – but 
without great success. 
When, in fall 1993, the Security Council debated about setting up a 
peacekeeping force for Rwanda, the U.S. government was reluctant. As 
General Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian who would be in command of 
UNAMIR, expressed his believe that he would need 5,000 troops for his 
mission, U.S. officials declared that their government would not send troops 
to this country and was, furthermore, not willing to pay for a troop of 5,000. 
Reluctantly, Dallaire trimmed his finally written request to 2,500 (Power, 
2003, 341). And on October 5, 1993, the Security Council authorized the 




IV.2. Getting Our People Out!: The Evacuation  
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The first reaction of the U.S. government to the outbreak of violence in 
Rwanda is the evacuation of U.S. nationals from the country. In a 
memorandum, dated April 6, 1994, Prudence Bushnell, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs and State Department’s 
number-two official for Africa matters, informs Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, of the assassination of the Rwandan and Burundian presidents. 
The memo points out that the Rwandan military is taking over control of 
several sites in the capital, and emphasizes that a spread of violence is likely 
(Bushnell, April 6, 1994). On April 12, President Clinton informs the 
Congress that he had ordered the evacuation of the approximately 240 U.S.-
Americans living in the country. Due to the fighting around Kigali Airport, 
bringing the people out of country has to be organized by overland convoy 
(Clinton, 1994). The U.S. joins into the efforts of France and Belgium, which 
had the largest expatriate communities living in Rwanda and had been the 
first to undertake measures. On April 8, 1994, two days after the plane crash, 
190 French paratroopers had landed as part of Operation Amaryllis, an 
evacuation mission. The next day, 250 Belgian soldiers had arrived with a 
similar assignment.
22 Their mission was to evacuate all foreign nationals — 
not Rwandans — who wanted to leave, and both countries were eager to 
assure that the only function of the deployed troops was to protect their 
citizen from harm and that beyond this, they had no intention to play the 
policeman in the east-Africa (Riding, April 11, 1994, 12). With the 
evacuation order of the U.S.-American President, the French-Belgian 
operation was backed by 300 U.S. Marines, based in Bujumbura, Burundi. 
Yet, the American troops never entered the country but confined themselves 
to receive the escapees after they had crossed the border. 
The evacuation convoys did not only take U.S.-Americans and other 
Westerners out of the country, but with them the stories of what they had 
                                                 
22   Prunier 1995, 234  
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witnessed prior to their rescue. The interviews with the evacuated published 
by U.S. newspapers opened a first window through which the dimension of 
the violence breaking out in Rwanda started to become visible. Their accounts 
transported the atmosphere of fear that had captured the country and the 
despair of the rescued about having left behind people — friends, employees, 
even family members — to fall victim to a secure death (Lorch, April 11, 
1994). Most importantly, these reports gave an account of the genocidal 
nature of the violence. One article, headlined »Evacuation: American 
Evacuees Describe Horrors Faced by Rwandans«, cites an American official 
with the Centers for Disease Control, who »said members of the Tutsi ethnic 
group were among the worst hit in the first night of fighting.« (Lorch, April 
11, 1994) 
 
IV.3. Hands Off: U.S. Politics in the U.N. Security Council 
From the beginning, the escalation of the Rwandan crisis had spill over 
effects to other countries. Spill over effects so severe that, before long, the 
“Rwandan case” had to be treated in the U.N. Security Council. The event 
that initiated this U.N. attention were attacks on Belgian members of 
UNAMIR occurring from the early hours of the genocide: Immediately after 
the plane crash, on April 6, 1994, the Rwandan military had disarmed the 
Belgian peacekeepers stationed at Kigali airport (Bushnell, April 6, 1994, 3). 
On April 7, the prime minister in office, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, was 
attacked and killed in her residence which was protected by ten Belgian 
UNAMIR soldiers. Apparently, the Belgian soldiers were unprepared for such 
an assault on their protégée. Faced with an infuriated crowd accompanied by 
the Presidential Guard, they were hesitant what to do — and eventually 
dropped their weapons. They were brought to a nearby military camp and 
killed (Prunier, 1995, 230). In what later became known as the “genocide  
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fax”, the Canadian commander of the UNAMIR force, General Roméo 
Dallaire had informed U.N. peacekeeping officials — Major General Maurice 
Baril, military adviser to Secretary General, and Kofi Annan, at the time 
Under Secretary General for peacekeeping operations — something like this 
was very likely to happen. He had informed his superiors that a breakout of 
violence was prepared in Rwanda the goal of which was to eliminate large 
numbers of Tutsi. The attacking Belgian peacekeepers was part of the plan, 
and should secure a pull out of the U.N. troops. 
Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgians [sic!, TKB] 
soldiers resorted to force a number of them were to be killed and 
thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda. (Dallaire, 
January 11, 1994) 
But Dallaire’s warnings were ignored by his superiors, and his plan to raid the 
arms caches stopped.  
Without the killings of the U.N. peacekeepers, violence in Rwanda might 
have remained just another African conflict. But with the death of U.N. 
soldiers, it immediately attained a transnational dimension. The West had to 
violently realize that it was holding stakes in the Rwandan conflict. It had 
become impossible to ignore the events. During the first two days following 
the plane crash, Belgian representatives at the United Nations urged for the 
formation of an U.N. emergency intervention force (Prunier, 1995, 234). But 
since they could not obtain any decision, they unilaterally, without 
authorization of the Security Council, pulled out all of their 450 blue-beret 
soldiers, on April 14, arguing that their presence would be useless. The U.N. 
could not avoid decision any longer. The Security Council had to make clear 
its position in the matter. On April 15 and 16, the Council held official 
sessions to debate on the next steps in Rwanda. On April 21, it voted 
Resolution 912, reducing UNAMIR from 1,700 to 270. According to the 
resolution, the significantly reduced force was now mandated  
»(a) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt 
to secure their agreement to a cease-fire;(b) To assist in the  
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resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent 
feasible; and (c) To monitor and report on developments in 
Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who 
sought refuge with UNAMIR.« (United Nations Security Council, 
April 21, 1994) 
The decision was based on a report of the Secretary General, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, dated April 20, 1994, which suggested that, after the 
escalation of Rwandan conflict, the U.N. force should be either substantially 
strengthened or reduced to a symbolic size. These extreme proposals were 
motivated by the acknowledgement of the fact that with the escalation of 
violence in the country, there was no peace left to keep. Maintaining a 
“peacekeeping” mission would therefore be a pointless undertaking. Either 
the U.N. members would have to engage in an effective operation to stop the 
violence — or they would have to admit their incapability to do so by 
practically pulling out their troops. Boutros-Ghali himself strongly favored 
the first of the alternatives, and with him the African and other (third world) 
members of the Security Council, but they were unable to win the necessary 
majority, and, most importantly, did not manage to convince the veto 
powers.
23  
When the Belgian government had pulled out its troops, the Belgian foreign 
minister Willie Claes had asked Washington to cover his government’s 
decision. »We are pulling out«, he said, »but we don’t want to be seen to be 
doing it alone.« (quoted in Power, 2003, 367) With this request to join a 
support of a full U.N. withdrawal, Brussels jammed open doors in 
Washington. In a briefing cable to the diplomats in the U.S. Mission to the 
U.N. in New York, the State Department had laid out the U.S.-American 
policy guideline (United States. Department of State, April 15, 1994): The 
government expressed its 
»[…] believes that there is insufficient justification to retain a 
                                                 
23  For further details on the U.N. proceedings in the Rwandan case, especially in 
relation to the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, see Shabas, 1999, 459-462.   
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U.N. peacekeeping presence in Rwanda and that the 
international community must give highest priority to full, 
orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as 
possible.« (United States. Department of State, April 15, 1994, 2-
3) 
The language was plain and ruled out any doubts. State Department instructed 
its U.N. diplomats to make clear  
»[…] that we will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a 
UNAMIR.« (United States. Department of State, April 15, 1994, 
3)  
»[…] Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in 
Rwanda is firm. It is based on our conviction that the Security 
Council has an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping 
operations  are viable, that they are capable of fulfilling their 
mandate , and that U.N. peacekeeping personnel are not placed 
or retained, knowingly in an untenable situation.« (United 
States. Department of State, April 15, 1994, 5) 
This position pronounced by the State Department was not a marginal 
opinion, but echoed beliefs widespread in the U.S.-American public. The 
same day the instructing cable had been transmitted to the U.S. mission at the 
U.N., the Republican leader of the U.S. Senate, Robert Dole, declared in an 
interview in the CBS television program Face the Nation: 
I don’t think we have any national interest here [in Rwanda, 
TKB]. I hope we don't get involved there. I don't think we will. 
The Americans are out. As far as I'm concerned in Rwanda, that 
ought to be the end of it. (quoted in Sciolino, April 15, 1994)  
The refusal to maintain a UNAMIR force was justified by pointing out that 
the violence in the civil war torn country left no place for a peacekeeping 
mission in the country. U.S. officials insisted that a cessation of violence must 
be prior to any renewed involvement of U.N. troops. From the beginning, the 
expression of this conviction had been — carefully — accompanied by the 
suggestion of a mediating mission between the civil war parties. The same 
State Department policy guideline paper that so firmly insisted on the U.S.-
American demand to withdraw all U.N. troops, also pointed out the 
usefulness of mediation efforts  
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»There may be a role for the U.N. to play in facilitating 
negotiations among the warring parties but that is a role for a 
representative of the Secretary General, not for UNAMIR. We 
are willing to support and encourage a political initiative by the 
Secretary General to promote reconciliation among the parties.« 
(United States. Department of State, April 15, 1994, 6) 
From the beginning, it was part of the U.S.-American policy strategy to urge 
for a regional solution of the conflict. When, in their perspective, the focus of 
the foreign activities should be on obtaining a ceasefire between the RPF and 
the Rwandan government, the priority candidate for mediating such an 
agreement was not the Secretary General, but the organisation of African 
Unity (OAU). A White House press release of April 22, 1994, that became 
notorious for being the only one in which a Western politician explicitly 
names high-ranking Rwandan officials responsible for the (genocidal) 
violence and calls them to end it, synthesizes the U.S.-American position on 
how foreign countries should contribute to a de-escalation of the Rwandan 
conflict 
»We call on the Rwandan army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
to agree on an immediate ceasefire and return to negotiations 
called for and facilitated by the Government of Tanzania. We 
applaud the efforts of regional leaders who are actively engaged 
in the search for peace and call on the people of the region to 
support their quest. The United States is prepared to participate, 
as in the past, in renewed negotiation in the context of the 
Arusha Agreement of August 4, 1994.« (United States. White 
House. Office of the Press Secretary, April 22, 1994) 
That the U.S. government gave up this uncompromising position and finally 
agreed to a U.N. resolution ordering only a significant reduction and not a 
complete withdrawal as requested in the policy guideline cable was a 
consequence of pressure from third world member countries in the Security 
Council, and of the efforts of U.N. representative Madeleine Albright to 
convince their superiors in Washington that the proposed position was 
untenable (Lewis, April 30, 1994). Nevertheless, the U.S.-American position 
highly influenced the rhetoric of the Security Council decision. Resolution 
912 echoes the ideas synthesized in the White House press release when it  
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»[…][d]emands an immediate cessation of hostilities between the forces of 
the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.« (United 
Nations Security Council, April 21, 1994, 2), mandates the reduced UNAMIR 
force »[t]o act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure 
their agreement to a cease-fire«
 (United Nations Security Council, April 21, 
1994, 2) and »calls on the leaders of the region, especially the facilitator to 
the Arusha peace process, to persevere and intensify their efforts, in 
cooperation with OAU and the United Nations.« (United Nations Security 
Council, April 21, 1994, 3) 
The decision to withdraw the peacekeeping forces did not remain the final 
word spoken on the Rwandan conflict. And again, it was a particular turn in 
the Rwandan events generating spill over effects to other countries that forced 
the Security Council to reconsider the issue. When in the first stage of the 
conflict, it were the bodies of ten killed blue-helmet soldiers that had 
necessitate a decision, by end of April 1993, it was a wave of refugees 
streaming into Rwanda’s neighboring countries. As I have already outlined, 
the outbreak of violence generated two different fugitive movements, the first 
one of Rwandans fleeing the genocidal massacres, the second one of 
Rwandans fearing retributive violence on the part of the RPF. The situation 
culminated when, on April 28/29, 1994, due to the advance of the RPF, a 
record-breaking 250,000 Rwandan refugees crossed the Tanzanian border 
within twenty-four hours. Again the Rwandan conflict had, in an unignorable 
way, spilled over the national borders, creating burdens to third parties, 
spelling headlines for newspapers all over the world.
24 Again the violence had 
transformed observers into players, generated stakeholdership in the conflict 
in countries that, in the first place, had nothing to with it. A handful of 
                                                 
24  One factor that should not be underestimated is the fact that news media are a key 
catalyst in directing public attention. It must be kept in mind that television channels and 
newspapers are economic enterprises that have to face problems of costs and resources. 
Reporting from a UNHCR managed refugee camp is easier, less risky and less expensive 
than reporting from the inside of a country in violent conflict. This was one important  
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nonpermanent members of the Security Council pressed the major powers to 
send a new beefed-up force to Rwanda. The question had to be answered 
whether the Rwandan mission should be altered from a Chapter VI to a 
Chapter VII operation. 
In the discussions, two proposals emerged. UNAMIR commander Dallaire 
demanded to reinforce his force by an additional 5,000 troops that would first 
secure Kigali and later fan outward to create save havens for the Rwandans 
gathered in large numbers in churches, schools and hillsides all over the 
country. The U.S. was among the few countries that could facilitate a quick 
deployment of the reinforcement troops to the region. But to the senses of 
U.S. foreign policy strategists, Dallaire’s project was too dangerous (because 
of heavy fighting in and around Kigali), to expensive, and because of that not 
very likely to incite material and personnel support of U.N. member 
countries. The counterproposal developed in the U.S. National Security 
Council envisaged another type of operation. Save havens should be 
established not within the country, but at Rwanda’s borders, imitating the 
strategy used in 1991 during Operation Provide Comfort for the Kurds of 
northern Iraq. On May 13, 1994, a cable was telegraphed as a negotiation 
guideline to the U.N. mission of the United States in New York, explaining 
the U.S. concerns about the project proposed by Dallaire, expressing a refusal 
to lift, in the given situation, heavy equipment and troops into Kigali, and 
proposing as an alternative the strategy just outlined (United States. 
Department of State, May 13, 1994). Apparently, the proposal of the U.S. 
government was no response to the needs of the people most vulnerable to 
genocidal massacres were clustered together in churches, schools, hospitals or 
stadiums surrounded by the ‘Hutu’ militia or the military, and would not 
make it to the borders. And the cable is clear about the fact that the intention 
of this mission would not be to stop a genocide: 
                                                                                                                                                    
reason why news media so gratefully jumped on the record-breaking exodus.  
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»The mandate of this expanded UNAMIR force would be to 
establish safe zones along the Rwandan border for refugees and 
displaced persons and to provide security for the provision of the 
assistance by humanitarian agencies to those persons and 
security for the humanitarian assistance efforts.« (United States. 
Department of State, May 13, 1994, 5) 
 
But as discussions wore on, the United States finally acceded to a version of 
Dallaire’s plan. On May 17, 1994 the Security Council voted resolution 918 
decreeing a reinforcement of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops. But the consequences 
of this new resolution were near to zero. The major powers in the Security 
Council were not inclined to make a move. At least, Vice President Al Gore 
committed the U.S. to provide armored support if African countries provided 
soldiers. But only few African countries stepped forward to offer troops. And 
when two days later the U.N. formally requested fifty armored personnel 
carriers (APCs) from the U.S. government, their delivery was delayed by 
squabbles about who would be going to pay for the provision of the vehicles 
and whether the latter would be subject to buying or leasing. In consequence, 
it was already mid-June, when the U.S. started to transport the vehicles, and 
they did not arrive in Rwanda until July (Power, 2003, 379-380; Shabas, 
1999, 461). 
Those debates about the appropriate military strategy for dealing with the 
Rwandan conflict were only one of two battles fought in the Security Council 
on the Rwandan case. Parallel to those discussions, a debate was going on 
about what would be the appropriate term to specify the Rwandan violence. 
The question was far from being trivial since if what was going on in the 
country was a genocide, the member countries of the Security Council would 
have been legally obliged to act, according to article 8 of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  
U.S. foreign policy officials were well aware of that. In a DOD discussion 
paper documenting a debate about the feasible options in response to the  
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Rwandan crisis, one paragraph proposes to call “for an international 
investigation of human rights abuses and possible violation of the genocide 
convention”. The comment noted underneath this proposal says: 
»Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—
Genocide finding could commit USG to ‘do something’.« (United 
States. Department of Defense, May 1, 1994, 1) 
At the same time, the paper testifies how well informed the officials were 
about the nature of the conflict:  
»The U.S. will continue to seek an embargo on Rwanda (i.e. 
weapons, arms ect.) we do not envision it will have a significant 
impact on the killings because machetes, knives and other hand 
implements have been the most common weapons.« (United 
States. Department of Defense, May 1, 1994, 3) 
For many weeks, the U.S. administration opposed the use of the term 
genocide and forbade its officials to use it. And this opposition against 
formally acknowledging the fact that a genocide was under way in Rwanda 
highly influenced the language of the resolutions voted in the Security 
Council. Resolution 918 which had been voted on May 17, 1994 and decreed 
the reinforcement of UNAMIR did this without naming the violence in 
Rwanda genocide. It confines itself to a quote from the Genocide Convention 
when it recalls »that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the 
intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime 
punishable under international law« (United Nations Security Council, May 
17, 1994). 
It was not until May 21, 1994, that State Department officials were authorized 
to state publicly that “acts of genocide have occurred” in Rwanda, and that 
U.S. delegations to international meetings were permitted to agree to 
resolutions referring to “acts of genocide” in Rwanda (United States. 
Department of State, May 21, 1994). But still then, the permission was 
basically restricted to the employment of those particular terms. The 
reluctance to state that, in general, the killings in Rwanda are genocide, 
remained (Power, 2003, 362-364).  
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In 8 June 1994, when already almost 800,000 people have been killed in 
Rwanda and the facts could no longer be concealed by diplomatic speech, the 
Security Council finally voted resolution 925 which noted »with the gravest 
concern the reports indicating that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda« 
(United Nations Security Council, June 8, 1994, 1). With this resolution, the 
U.N. body had obligated itself to action. In mid-June, the French government 
decided its plan to send troops in order to establish save zones in the 
Southwest of the country. Again, the motive of this sudden and somehow 
surprising decision – the French government had entertained warm 
relationships with the Habyarimana government and delivered weapons to the 
country – was not the determination to stop a genocide (most of the people 
were already dead), but the growing concern of Paris about the advance of the 
RPF in the country and the fear to loose a French zone of influence to an 
Anglophone movement.
25 The following steps were a proof of the pace at 
which a determined government could move. On June 21, 1994, the Security 
Council voted resolution 929 authorizing Opération Turquoise. The French 
mission was designed to be a bridge-action until the new U.N. intervention 
force decreed 6 weeks before had arrived in the country. 
 
IV.4. Restore Hope: The Humanitarian Mission 
With the mass exodus occurring in late April 1994, Rwanda had become “a 
case” for international relief agencies. Under the auspices of the UNHCR, 
refugee camps had been set up in northern Burundi, western Tanzania, 
southwestern Uganda and eastern Zaire. In the following weeks, the UNHCR, 
non-governmental humanitarian relief organisations and different donor 
                                                 
25  Because during the exodus in the late 1960s, most refugees settled in Uganda, as 
most other states in the region an Anglophone country, and because later, the major base of 
the RPF was established there, English and not French had become the language of the 
RPF see Klinghoffer, 1998, 82; (Prunier, 1995, 285-291).   
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countries undertake efforts to provide shelter, food and medical care to the 
refugees; they construct water supply systems and fight a cholera epidemic. 
By August, as the first efforts of repatriation had failed, it became apparent, 
that this emergency intervention would not end after a couple of weeks. It 
silently transformed itself into a long-term engagement.
26  
It was only in late July, almost a month after the French intervention 
Opération Turquoise had been launched, and after the RPF had declared, on 
July 17, 1994, the end of the civil war, that U.S. began to decisively engage in 
the relief operations. The agency in charge was the Office of Humanitarian 
and Refugee Affairs of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the main 
concern was with the ‘Hutu’ refugees in the UNHCR administrated camps in 
Rwanda’s neighboring countries. In the first place, the goal was to stabilize 
their situation, that means to secure food and water supply as well as the 
provision of medical care. By July 25, 1994, 300 metric tons of supplies had 
been delivered to the camps, mainly rice, grain and cooking oil, but also 
plastic sheeting, vehicles, medicines and other sort of medical gear. 
Principally, they came from other governments and private volunteer 
organisations. But the major difficulty was not the quantity of food available 
— according to DOD officials there was enough to feed the refugees — but 
its transport and proper distribution, as well as the supply of clean water 
                                                 
26  From the beginning, the situation in the camps was highly problematic. Especially 
in Zaire, they became the main base for the defeated Rwandan Armed Forces and members 
of the militia interahamwe, two organisations highly involved in carrying out the genocide. 
The life in the camps was strictly organized and controlled by those militia-men and 
soldiers. Tents in Goma for example were grouped by secteur, commune and prefecture, 
mirroring the administrative organisation of the country the refugees had just left. This 
situation created serious security problems for the refugees—especially as they belonged to 
the ‘Tutsi’ or were known as members of the political opposition—as well as difficult 
moral dilemmas for the relief workers (UNHCR, 2000, 246-247). After the RPF had 
overthrown the government in Kigali the ‘refugees’ who had been participating in the 
genocidal killings had little incentive to go back, even more so, after the U.N. had decreed, 
in November 1994, by resolution 955, brought into being the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda. By November 1994, the problem of the politisation/militarisation of 
the camps had become so flagrant that major non-governmental relief organisations 
threatened to quit cooperation since the UNHCR was obviously without political control 
over the camps (Prunier, 1995, 313).  
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(United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 1994, 4-5). 
The U.S. Army deployed five ARL ships with trucks in response to the 
shortage of vehicles, and U.S. personnel worked to enlarge the capacity of 
Goma (Zaire) airport that constituted the primary hub for support flights as 
long as the security situation in the Rwandan capital remained hazardous 
(United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 1994, 11, 
13-11, 14). In the refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu (Zaire), U.S.-
American relief workers installed high-performance water filtration systems, 
provided by the San Francisco Fire Department. While the short term goal 
was the stabilization of the situation of the refugees, the long term objective 
was to prepare their repatriation. According to General John Sheehan, DOD 
responsible for the Rwanda operation, the most important task in late July was 
to encourage the refugees to go home. On July 25, 1994, following the 
example in Bosnia-Herzegovina, U.S. airplanes in cooperation with the 
UNHCR launched a series of airdrops of food supplies over Rwandan 
territory. The goal was to discourage people still on the run from streaming 
out of the country and into the camps (United States Congress. Senate. 
Committee on Armed Services, 1994, 11, 15-11, 16). 
On July 29, 1994, in support of the humanitarian relief operations, the 
Department of Defense deployed 2100 U.S. military personnel to the region 
as part of a Joint Task Force named Support Hope. Headquarters being at 
Entebbe (Uganda), the force ran logistical operations in Goma and Bukavu, 
(Zaire), Nairobi and Mombassa (Kenya), as well as in Kigali. With the 
situation in the capital stabilizing after the declared end of the civil war, the 
focal point for the coordination of the relief activities moved from the Zairian 
Goma to Kigali, at International airport of which U.S.-American troops 
sustained an 24-hour expanded air-logistics site that now became the hub for 
all relief flights in support of humanitarian operations. At the height of the 
operation, there were about 200 U.S. military personnel in Kigali, including a 
Civil-Military Operation Center, a large U.S. Air Force Tactical Airlift  
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Liaison and Control Element, other staff and logistical personnel, and a 
Military Police detachment for force protection of U.S. military personnel.  
The administration was eager to assure publicly that those troops would be 
deployed for the sole purpose of humanitarian relief, not for peacekeeping 
(United States. White House, July 29, 1994). Nevertheless, Congress 
expressed its disregard of the mission: From the $320 million requested by 
the president, the U.S. Senate authorized only $170 million and wrote into the 
legislation that all forces have to be withdrawn by October 1, 1994 unless 
congress specifically approved a longer stay (Power, 2003, 381). However, a 
review of peace operations’ costs made in 1996 by the General Accounting 
Office reveals that spending in this year went up to $261 million (United 
States Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed  Services, 1994, 17). 
When UNAMIR II was finally set up, U.S. decisions remained consistent 
with the strategies announced. Adhering to the principle that supporting 
Rwanda’s regional pears in their efforts to settle the conflict was to be 
preferred over a direct U.S.-American involvement, they never committed 
own personnel to the operation, but adopted the Ghanaian battalion (about 
800 troops) in the new UNAMIR II force. Adoption meant that the U.S. 
government provided the Ghanaian troop, on a reimbursable basis (leasing or 
sale), with the equipment it used in the U.N. peacekeeping operation. By July 
25, 1994, the Ghanaian battalion was the only one of the projected UNAMIR 
already in place; 50 APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers) and other equipment, 
had been provided (United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed  
Services, 1994, 17). 
 
This chapter has shown that, despite the moral pressure that resulted from the 
mediatisation of the Rwandan genocide, the United States government was 
more than hesitant to become militarily involved in this African conflict. 
Until the end, the Clinton government avoided to make considerable financial 
contributions and especially to contribute U.S.-American military personal. In  
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the following chapter, I will trace the political reasons for the adoption of this 
hesitant strategy, based on the theoretical model developed in III.3. 
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V. Outlines of an Interpretation 
In understanding those actions undertaken by the U.S. government when 
faced with the Rwandan genocide, two factors are decisive. First, the specific 
historic situation after the end of the Cold War and the conditions it created in 
the political system and the U.S. society. Second, certain general features of 
the U.S. American constitutional system. I will turn to those latter first, before 
examining the specific historic conditions.  
It must be remarked, however, that the discussion provided in this chapter 
does not imply that given the constitutional and historic circumstances, the 
reaction of the United States government could not have been otherwise. 
History is contingent as choices are made by humans, and if, at one point in 
time, the road would have taken another turn, the world might have witnessed 
a different end of the Rwandan conflict. 
 
V.1. Constitutional Obstacles 
Already early political scientists have pointed to the fact that the principles of 
democratic governance are incompatible with the necessities of foreign policy 
making. »For my part«, declared the admirer of the U.S. constitution, Alexis  
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de Tocqueville, »I have no hesitation in saying that in the control of society’s 
foreign affairs democratic governments do appear decidedly inferior to 
others.« (Tocqueville, 1959, 226) The principle argument states that, because 
of the principle of participation, democracies are dependent upon the wisdom 
of their citizens; while it can plausible assume that those citizens are 
competent in dealing with questions of domestic governance, considering the 
problems foreign affairs is beyond their capability (Tocqueville, 1959, 228). 
In his Second Treatise, John Locke makes a similar argument when he notes 
that foreign policy powers should always been associated with the executive 
(and not with the legislative) since a division of those two would invite 
»disorder and ruin« (Locke, 1987, 146-148). 
This type of questioning of the wisdom of the popular masses and the 
discussions about the feasibility of »good« policy-making is known since 
antiquity and the validity of the arguments on both sides can be discussed ad 
infinitum. But there is another, namely a structural, difficulty of foreign 
policy-making in democracies which stems not from the participative but 
from the representative feature of this type of government and which is 
particularly prevalent in the political system of the United States. Contrary to 
the voting-list systems employed in several European countries, popular 
representation in the U.S. is organized around the rule »One district, one 
vote.« This means that the support of the constituents in the home district is 
the only way to be (re)elected as a member of Congress. Promoting the 
interests of one’s electoral district is therefore the major goal of any 
candidate/representative and the central expectation of voters. Once in 
Congress, the strategies of the member will depend upon the standing she has 
in her district: If she has won the elections only with a slight margin, she will 
be propelled to spend more time engaging in his district, as if he had no 
serious opposition to face. The insecure members of Congress will seek for 
involvement in policy fields, and most importantly committee assignments, 
related to constituency interests, while only more secure members are free to  
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follow their own policy interests. This means that for a member of the 
legislative branch, the incentive for an involvement in foreign affairs is weak, 
since the instances where international issues affect an electoral district too 
such an extent that the constituents will demand of their representative to 
engage in this field, instead of dealing with domestic problems, are few. 
Among those cases are southern districts facing the problem of illegal 
immigration or districts hosting military bases or defense related industries. 
But even then, the representative is expected to advance the interest of her 
constituents, and not the interests of some people in a foreign country. 
Generally, in balance of power game among the branches, Congress can act 
as a promoter of a certain issue, raise public support for certain positions and 
even impose the policy preferences of its constituents against the once 
articulated by the Executive.
27 But in the case of foreign affairs decisions, this 
is not very likely to happen, since in many cases Congress will not have any 
specific position, which deprives it of its capacity to act as a counterpart 
against the presidency. 
 
V.2. Opportunity Costs 
 
Preference Changes: The early post-Cold War Period 
The end of the Cold War, which brought the hope of freedom and even peace 
to many people in the world, brought a spiritual crisis to the U.S.-American 
democracy. For decades, the country had engaged as the »leader of the free 
world«, and over decades, in a slow but continuous process, the political 
system of the United States had changed in order to serve this goal. First, 
because the preeminence given to security and foreign policy issues had 
                                                 
27  See for example Mueller, 2003, 391-405 and Kieweit,McCubbins, 1988.  
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introduced substantial changes in the constitutional setting, leaving the 
President an almost imperial status in foreign policy, and especially in 
military actions. Second, because significant economic and political resources 
had been dedicated to secure and to strengthen the U.S.-American foreign 
policy position. With a yearly budget of $250 billion, the United States 
entertained the largest military in the world; fighting the operation Desert 
Storm against Iraq, which is the fourth largest military worldwide, only 
demanded as much as twenty percent of the U.S. military capacity (Borosage, 
1994). 
While as long as the Cold War wore on, any criticisms of this development 
had been easily rejected by pointing to the imperative of serving national 
security interests, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the enormous domestic 
opportunity costs of the Cold War foreign policy strategy could no longer be 
concealed. Barbara Ehrenreich, a popular social scientist, describes this U.S.-
American state of mind in the early 1990s: 
»We began to see ourselves as a militarily overdeveloped 
superpower in an advanced stage of domestic decline – a heavily 
armed warrior living, Mad Max-style, in a dilapidated hovel. We 
could accomplish almost anything abroad, it seemed, but at 
home the young were undereducated, the infrastructure rusted 
and rotted, jobs were scarce, crime worsened, and beggars 
multiplied in the streets. […] The Los Angeles riots in April 1991 
showed what the price could be for the neglect of the urban poor. 
Even Hurricane Andrew joined a growing list of ‘wake-up calls’: 
The United States could mobilize a mighty military presence to 
beat back Iraqi forces in Kuwait, but it could respond only 
falteringly to a natural disaster on its own shores. We could 
house hundreds of thousands of American men and women in the 
Arabian desert but not in our own ruined cities.« (Ehrenreich, 
1994, vii)  
Polls document this dramatic change in foreign policy preference patterns: In 
the early Cold War period until 1960, the majority of U.S.-Americans 
unanimously considered foreign affairs, namely the threat of international 
communism, the most important problem facing the nation; thus, in 1951, 82  
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percent opposed reductions in defense spending after the end of the Korean 
War, and support for the use of U.S. forces abroad was high. This position 
was modified in after the 1960s and the Vietnam debacle perceptions of threat 
weakened and a greater plurality of societal perspectives on foreign and 
defense policy became possible, but the leading and pro-active role of the 
United States in the international arena remained a central topic (Nincic, 
Rose, Gorski, 1999, 181-182). After the end of the Cold War, this kind of 
internationalism has not simply been replaced by staunch isolationism. Alvin 
Richman analyses a series of polls executed between 1974 and 1994 to 
evaluate the public attitude towards international involvement (Richman, 
1996). The data is represented using four dimensions: Global altruism (e.g. 
promoting human rights abroad), U.S. Global Interest (e.g. improving the 
Global Environment), Domestic Issues factor bearing on foreign policy (e.g. 
protecting the jobs of American workers, stemming the flow of illegal drugs 
into the U.S.), Military Security (e.g. use of U.S. troops abroad). The polls 
analyzed show that to the American public military security and the 
promotion of global interests of the United States are as important after the 
end of the Cold War as they were before. The inclination towards actions 
dealing with foreign policy problems with direct impact on domestic issues 
even rose above the 1980s levels. Only in the dimension of Global Altruism, 
the measures sharply declined. Particularly significant are the changes in 
attitudes towards the promotion of human rights abroad, the protection of 
weaker nations against aggression and towards actions to improve the living 
standards in the least developed countries.
28 Not isolationism, but sensibility 
                                                 
28  Richman, 1996, 307-308. His findings are based on a series of surveys executed 
between 1974 and 1994 by the Chicago Council of foreign relations. In the 
questionnaire, five questions are relating to the dimension of Global Altruism: 1. Goal 
of “combating world hunger”, in 1994 rated “very important” by 56 percent – slightly 
below the previous levels; 2. Goal of “promoting human rights abroad, in 1994 rated 
“very important” by 34 percent, nearly 10 percent below 1980s level; 3. Goal of 
“promoting democratic governments abroad”, in 1994 rated “very important” by 25 
percent, – slightly below the previous levels; 4. Goal of “protecting weaker nationals 
against aggression, in 1994 rated “very important” by 24 percent, about 10 percent  
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for the domestic opportunity costs of international involvement is the key 
feature of the post-Cold War pattern of foreign policy preferences. People 
oppose international involvement when they believe that international 
challenges can be met only on the expense of domestic needs.  
 
Policy Changes: Hostility Against International Peacekeeping 
It had belonged to the rules of the Cold War power game that it was always 
possible to make the argument that the outcome of political or military 
conflicts in Asia, South-America or Africa would have impacts on the 
division of power in the international arena, and that an intervention in a 
foreign country might become necessary to secure one’s own sphere of 
influence. Now, with the Cold War over, political or military interventions on 
behalf of others could no longer be justified domestically by pointing to the 
national interest. U.S.-Americans became more sensible as to why their sons 
and daughters should day in battles fought in a foreign country.
29 
                                                                                                                                                    
below 1980s levels; 5. Goal of “improving LDC living standards, in 1994 rated “very 
important” by 22 percent, about 15 percent below 1980s levels. 
Another survey asking for the reasons that would justify U.S. military actions has 
similar implications (quoted in Nincic, Rose,Gorski, 1999, 194). 
 
 
29   A Harris Poll of February 1991 actually shows how support for U.S. ground combat 
in support of Kuwait declined with the level of casualties (quoted in Nincic,Nincic, 
1995, 424).   
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Consequently, from the diverse foreign policy fields, it was in the attitude 
towards international peacekeeping where the impact of this change in 
preferences was most vitally to be felt.  
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Security Council had authorized eighteen 
peacekeeping missions, which was more than the total of operations launched 
in the 40 years since the end of World War II. 70,000 U.N. peacekeepers were 
posted in missions around the world. But the financial constitution of the 
United Nations stipulated that the United States had to carry 31.7 percent of 
the overall peacekeeping costs, money that had to paid from the U.S. federal 
budget. In 1994, the year of the Rwandan genocide, the financial support to 
major peacekeeping missions reached an unprecedented peak of more than 
$2,5 billion (United States. General Accounting Office, 1996). According to a 
polemic argument, American citizens were paying for missions in very often 
in countries they might have hardly ever heard off and the problems of which 
did not affect them. The missions enjoying some popular awareness at this 
time, Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti, did not serve as encouraging examples. The 
most extreme form of this critique was expressed by populist movements that 
demonized the United Nations and stigmatized foreign policy as »social 
work«.
30 Therefore, in late 1993, Congress took serious measures to force the 
Clinton administration to work for a significant reduction of the U.N. 
peacekeeping costs – by reducing the number of missions as well as by 
reducing the U.S. shares in it. While in his address to the U.N. General 
Assembly, on September 27, 1993, President Clinton had promised that  
»[…] within the next few weeks, the United Stats will be current 
in our peacekeeping bills. I have worked hard with the Congress 
to get this done.« (Dumbrell, 1997, 44) 
the same Congress, two weeks later, release a bill unmistakably expressing its 
hostility against peacekeeping operations. The bill not only killed a proposed 
                                                 
30  One of the most popular proponents of this type of »America-first!« position was 
Pat Buchanan, republican candidate in the Presidential primary campaigns of 1992 
(Dumbrell, 1997, 44).   
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$175 million fund for unforeseen peacekeeping costs, but also withheld 10 
percent of its regular contributions until Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali would have appointed an Inspector General to fight waste and 
corruption; in addition, it canceled the fourth of five special payments 
planned to eliminate existing arrears and told the administration to cut the 
United States share of new peacekeeping bills from 31.7 to 25 percent (Lewis, 
October 10, 1993). The passing of this bill significantly limited the 
discretionary leeway of the President. Not only was it that by “power of the 
purse” the Congress had effectively reduced the possibility of the President to 
commit U.S. resources to U.N. peacekeeping mission, the bill was also strong 
in its symbolic character. Its passing was a clear sign that costly U.S. 
involvement abroad was now rated low among the policy preferences of the 
American people. 
 
The Pivotal Event: The Somalia Debacle 
Although according to the polls introduced at the beginning of this chapter, 
support for peacekeeping missions eroded as soon as the Cold War was over, 
it was not simply this general change in preferences that led to Congress’ 
harsh decision in late October. The parliaments position was strongly 
influence by and event which, three weeks before, had traumatized the U.S. 
American public (Klinghoffer, 1998, 95):: 
In 1992, against the background of a growing Congressional and media 
interest in the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia, the Bush Administration 
began to consider initiating a U.N. relief operation in Somalia. On 25 
November 1992, Bush told the NSC that he was determined “to do something 
about Somalia”. His plan was to launch an U.N. backed operation within a 
tight timetable so that at the day of the inauguration of his successor, Bill 
Clinton, 19 January 1993, the mission would by accomplished. Without  
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public announcement, he contacted U.N. Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
with the offer of US forces. The decision was made while the Congress was in 
recess. Congressional leaders were formally briefed and approved the 
decision of the President. The authorizing resolution passed the UN Security 
Council on 3 December. One day later, Bush addressed the nation and 
announced the deployment of 28.000 troops. In his speech, he emphasized 
that »the United States alone cannot right the world’s wrongs«. Nevertheless 
»we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without 
American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst 
for broader involvement of the community of nations« (United States, 1993, 
2174-2175). From the beginning, a number of high-ranking foreign policy 
officials and military experts had been uneasy about the deployment which, to 
their senses, invoked the »Vietnam syndrome«, worries about US forces 
being sucked into a quagmire (Dumbrell, 1997, 197-200). Time showed that 
their concerns were justified. 
Against the predictions of the leaving President Bush, the mission could not 
be accomplished until the date of his successor’s inauguration. While from 
December 1992 till April 1993, the mission had provided a degree of safety 
for the relief work, and public support for the intervention remained high, the 
situation destabilized after the Security Council, in April 1994 had voted a 
»nation building2 resolution on Somalia and taken over control of the 
operation. On 3 October 1993, three weeks before Congress voted the 
peacekeeping-bill, 18 US soldiers were killed in a Mogadishu firefight. A 
camera team happened to film the event, and, the same day, pictures of the 
dying »U.S.-boys« were shown in the prime time news. The dying of 
American soldiers during this mission provoked outrage among the US public 
and Congress; the President was accused for dangerously amateurish 
behavior. Under intense pressure, he announced the withdrawal of the troops. 
In a document titled Explaining Somalia to the Congress, the President sums  
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up the events with the phrase 
»Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands 
of American citizens, both military and civilian.« (Clinton, 2000, 
»Explaining Somalia …«, 146) 
This heroic language violently points to the fact, that the Somalia mission 
could in no ways be justified by any genuine U.S.-American interest. The 18 
soldiers did die for some diffuse and unspoken “higher task”. The Clinton 
administration had to carry the severe political consequences of this 
humanitarian mission it had not decreed itself. Relating to Rwanda, one U.S. 
official remembers: 
»Anytime you mentioned peacekeeping in Africa, the crucifixes 
and garlic would come up on every door.« (Power, 2003, 340)  
It was three days after the Mogadishu firefight that the first vote in the 
Security Council about the deployment of a peacekeeping force to Rwanda 









Clinton’s Promise: Domestic Investment of the “Peace Dividend” 
Already the vote for Bill Clinton, an unknown governor from the small state 
of Arkansas, at the Presidential elections in 1992 – the first presidential 
elections after the end of the Cold War – had mirrored the different  
63 
importance that U.S.-Americans attributed to foreign policy and defense 
issues in the »new world«. In sharp contrast to his competitor, President 
George W. Bush Sr., a political grand seigneur with decades of experience in 
national politics and a weakness for foreign policy issues, Clinton was the 
first U.S. president who had been born after World war one, he had never 
served in the military and, as a student, had even been involved in the anti-
Vietnam War movement (Barret, 1997, 79). His inexperience in international 
affairs was not a secret. But all this had not been an impediment to his been 
elected the new President. Clinton had won the elections with a program 
whose ambitions were with domestic reforms. In his presidential campaign, 
he had promised to focus »like a laser beam« on the economy and other 
domestic issues (quoted in Barret, 1997, 80), and, given the grave societal, 
infrastructural and economic problems of the United States in early 1990s, it 
was this strong commitment to the domestic concerns of the U.S. that brought 
him into office. 
A central topos in the rhetoric of the young Clinton administration was the  
idea of a post-Cold War “peace dividend” which would finance the planned 
reforms.
31 In his campaign manifesto Clinton proclaimed: 
We have a historic opportunity. The human and physical 
resources we once dedicated to winning the Cold War can now 
be rededicated to fulfilling unmet domestic needs. 
And he pledged to transfer savings from defense »dollar for dollar« into 
»investments in the American economy« (Clinton, Gore, 1992, 75-76). 
During his first weeks in office, Clinton called for $170 billion new 
investments and tax incentives over four years, which were to be paid for by 
taxes (from high income groups) and, most importantly, by spending cuts 
                                                 
31  This rhetoric had been widely employed, although as soon as in 1993 studies 
written on demand of government agencies had indicated that not only this Cold War 
peace dividend is relatively small (compared to other post-World War II peace dividends), 
but that in addition the federal government’s fiscal deficit restricted the application of the 
dividend for increasing expenditures in public investment, since it demanded that at least a 
portion of the savings is directed to deficit reduction (see for example Mann, February  
64 
from the military. Over four years, defense spending should be decreased by 
$88 billion from the Bush projections (Office of Management and Budget, 
February 17, 1993), so that by 1998 defense expenditures would be 40 
percent lower than at their Cold War heights. 
 
Facing Reality: In need of a Foreign Policy Strategy 
But as often the case, those electoral promises did not survive in the cold 
breath of everyday politics. The defense spending cuts that were destined to 
pay for the necessary domestic investments encountered serious opposition, 
not only from military officials, but also from labor unions and 
representatives of congressional districts hosting military bases or plants of 
defense related industries. Up to 2 million job losses were projected.
32 
Moreover, the Clinton administration had to realize that abstention from 
foreign policy and especially from international security politics was not 
viable. The reasons for that were multiple. Pressure came from the 
international policy arena, since for decades the leading role of the United 
States had been one of its central variables and remained a major expectation 
among countries all around the world. But most of all, pressure came from 
within the United States itself. First, because with the Cold War being over, 
the physical involvement of U.S. government agencies did not stop at once. 
U.S. military and intelligence units were posted all over the world and 
decisions about their future had to be taken. And second, because, after a 
hope for durable peace had flamed up after the fall of the Berlin Wall, polls in 
the in the early 1990s showed that U.S.-Americans became, again, 
                                                                                                                                                    
1993).  
32  Mann, February 1993, 21. A major problem was that cuts in defense spending 
spports disproportionately affected high-wage, high-skilled manufacturing jobs that the 
administration generally wanted to protect.  
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increasingly worried about national security,
33 since all over the world emerge 
what became known as »the new conflicts«. 
Thus, the young Clinton administration faced the task to develop a medium-
term foreign policy strategy that would satisfy U.S.-American security needs 
and would be as consistent as possible with the general policy principles the 
new democratic president stood for. The outcome was a kind of retrenched 
and economist Wilsonianism: a combination of selective engagement, modest 
democracy promotion and prioritization of foreign economic policy. In a 
speech given on September 13, 1993, at the Johns Hopkins University, the 
National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, explained the cornerstones of this 
new strategy (Lake, 2000, 20-27): 
»The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy 
of enlargement – enlargement of the world’s free community of 
market democracies. […] We must not allow this overarching 
goal to drive us into overreaching actions. To be successful, a 
strategy of enlargement must provide distinctions and set 
priorities.« (Lake, 2000, 22) 
He enumerated the four central components to this strategy of enlargement: 
strengthening of the community of major market democracies; helping to 
foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies; countering 
the aggression of states hostile to democracy and markets; and pursuing a 
humanitarian agenda (Lake, 2000, 22). In this context, he did not disguise his 
believe that the focal points of U.S. foreign policy at this moment (Bosnia and 
Somalia) were ill chosen. Strengthening democracy in Northern America, 
Europe and Japan, consolidating and enlarging democracy and markets in key 
places, as well as addressing backlash states such as Iran and Iraq should be at 
the core of future U.S. foreign policy (Lake, 2000, 25). »I believe strongly«, 
he concluded, »that our foreign policies must marry principle and 
pragmatism. We should be principled about our purposes but pragmatic about 
our means.« (Lake, 2000, 26) 
                                                 
33 “Americans  talk  security”, May 18, 1993; quoted in Borosage, 1994, 65   
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This new agenda unambiguously focused on the economic aspects of 
international cooperation and left little room for peacekeeping or conflict 
resolution issues that affected economic interest only indirectly or in the very 
long term. In the newly formulated strategy, this gap was filled by attributing 
a strengthened role to the United Nations. In his 1993 address to the U.N. 
General Assembly, President Clinton assured the representatives that he did 
not plan to give in to isolationist tendencies in his country: 
»[W]ith the Cold War over, I know many people ask whether the 
United States plans to retreat or to remain active in the world 
and, if active, to what end. Many people are asking that in our 
own country as well. Let me answer that question as clearly and 
plainly as I can. The United States intends to remain engaged 
and to lead. We cannot solve every problem, but we must and 
will serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace.« 
(Clinton, 2000, “Globalism and interdependence …”, 16) 
As the three main fields of prospective U.S. engagement he enumerated 
nonproliferation, conflict resolution and sustainable development (Clinton, 
2000, “Globalism and interdependence…”, 17). He pronounced his belief in 
the importance of U.N. peacekeeping missions and tried to show that the 
latter were necessarily in the interest of the U.S. 
»UN peacekeeping holds the promise to resolve many of this 
era’s conflicts. […] Peacekeeping cannot be a substitute for our 
own national defense efforts, but it can strongly supplement 
them.« (Clinton, 2000, “Globalism and interdependence …”, 18) 
At the same time, Clinton admitted that U.S. contributions to those missions 
would not be without limit: 
»If the American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the 
United Nations must know when to say no.« (Clinton, 2000, 
“Globalism and interdependence …”, 19)  
 
Weak Commitments 
But those commitments to U.N. peacekeeping and international conflict 
resolutions were weak, since they were not backed by public and  
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congressional opinion. Clinton’s U.N. speech was held six days before the 
death of U.S. soldiers and almost a month before the Congress voted the 
peacekeeping bill – but the reluctance against those missions and the 
opposition to their costs were in the air since the early 1990s. Once, the 
Congress had passed the bill, there was no leeway left for president to 
contribute resources to such missions in discordance with popular opinion, 
even if he would have wanted to. It was clear that the major commitments of 
the Clinton government were to domestic needs and to the international 
promotion of the economic interests of the U.S. 
A month into the genocide, the government issued a document which should 
institutionally cement the U.S.-American reluctance against international 
peacekeeping missions. The Presidential Decision Directive 25 (United 
States, May 3, 1994) was the product of more than one year of interagency 
discussions and became the formal expression of the new U.S. peacekeeping 
doctrine. The directive enumerates sixteen factors that policymakers had to 
consider when deciding whether or not to support peacekeeping activities. 
The first seven of them define criteria that have to be met if the U.S. was to 
vote in the Security Council on a U.N. peace-operation carried out by non-
American soldiers. The first consists in the demand that the U.N. involvement 
should advance U.S. national interest and that a community of interest for the 
particular problem exists. Furthermore, it is stated that the condition for a 
peacekeeping operation is a ceasefire in place and thee consent of the 
opposing parties, while for peace enforcement operations the threat to 
international peace and security has to be significant. In both cases, action is 
justified only when the consequences of inactivity are unacceptable to the 
international community. A further condition for action is that the financial 
and personal means to accomplish the mission are available (United States. 
Department of State, May 1994, 4). The directive notes that against the 
background of those factors, the U.S. government will not only decide about 
new operations but also scrutinize the existing ones when they come up for  
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renewal in the Security Council (United States. Department of State, May 
1994, 4-5). 
If the U.S. was to participate in a U.N. operation, six additional and even 
more stringent conditions had to be met: The participation advances U.S. 
interests and the risks to American personnel are acceptable. Personnel, funds 
and other resources are available. U.S. participation is necessary for the 
operation’s success. Clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation 
can be identified. Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be 
marshaled. Command and control arrangements with the U.N. are acceptable 
(United States. Department of State, May 1994, 5). A third additional catalog 
enumerates another three factors that will be applied if U.S. troops should 
participate in Chapter VII operation which are likely to involve combat: There 
exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined 
objectives, furthermore a plan to achieve those objectives decisively, and a 
commitment to reassess and adjust thee size, composition and disposition of 
the U.S. forces to achieve the objectives (United States. Department of State, 
May 1994, 5). 
The directive emphasizes the role of the United Nations as the primary 
international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations, but 
it also stresses the importance of regional organisations. It announces that the 
U.S. will continue to support efforts to improve regional organisations’ 
peacekeeping capabilities and, under certain conditions, support the request of 
such organisations and groups to carry out peacekeeping missions endorsed 
by the U.N. Security Council (United States. Department of State, May 1994, 
6). The paper reaffirms that a reduction of U.N. peacekeeping costs – with 
regard to the costs in total and to the U.S.’ share in it – is a foremost condition 
for the U.S. government to support those missions in the long run (United 
States. Department of State, May 1994, 6-7). 
PDD 25 was a Janus-faced policy directive and one of the most controversial  
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documents issued by the Clinton administration’s first term. On the one hand, 
the restrictive checklist seemed to be a formalization of an already decided 
“Hands off!”-attitude towards international peacekeeping. In the words of 
Representative David Obey of Wisconsin, it tried to satisfy the American 
desire for »zero degree of involvement, and zero degree of risk, and zero 
degree of pain and confusion« (quoted in Power, 2003, 342). On the other 
hand, the directive might be understood as an attempt to save the very idea of 
U.S. foreign involvement in the new era. As Richard Clarke, member of the 
National Security Council and charged with the development of the new 
doctrine put it: 
»Many say PDD-25 was some evil thing designed to kill 
peacekeeping, when in fact it was there to save peacekeeping. 
Peacekeeping was almost dead. There was no support for it in 
the U.S. government, and the peacekeepers were not effective in 
the field.« (quoted in Power, 2003, 342) 
The foreign policy practice of the Cold War years, especially the almost 
exclusive concentration of foreign policy power in the executive branch and 
the high domestic opportunity costs, had to a significant extend discredited 
foreign involvement of U.S. governments. The Vietnam debacle in the 1970s, 
and the Iran-Contra Affair in the 1980s had become symbols of presidential 
foreign policy practices which despised the rules of democratic governance 
and had nothing to do with the interests of U.S. citizens. Those affairs stood 
for an intransparent system foreign policy making where one hand could 
never tell what the other was doing, where sometimes even the president was 
unaware of actions executed by his intelligence or defense units. The decision 
of the new government to commit itself to a published catalogue of criteria 
which narrowly defined under which conditions a foreign military 
involvement was permissible, was a clear break with those practices of Cold 
War governments and a signal of its willingness to democratize foreign policy 
making. As the final section of the directive states: 
»Traditionally, the Executive branch has not solicited the  
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involvement of Congress or the American people on matters 
related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not 
desirable in an era when peace operations have become more 
numerous, complex and expensive. The Clinton Administration is 
committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize 
communication and consultation on those important issues.« 




To the people in Rwanda, however, PDD 25 was fatal.
34 The conflict did not 
even meet the criteria necessary for the U.S. to support any mission to the 
country: No U.S. national interests were involved, there was no powerful 
alliance of stakeholders that would speak up in favor of an intervention, and – 
as cynical as this sounds – the threat this conflict in an already conflict torn 
and unstable region generated to international peace and security might have 
been neglectable. The only reason that was there to intervene into this conflict 
was to save the lives of almost a million non-combatant individuals which 
could not been saved otherwise as by the intervention of an outside force. But 
this case did not figure among the conditions listed in PDD 25. The U.S. 
governments’ reaction to the Rwandan crisis – its the hard-line position in the 
Security Council, the emphasis given to a regional solution of the conflict – 
appears like a text-book example for the application of the new doctrine to a 
»real case«. 
One of the most dramatic consequences of PDD 25 was that it sterilized the 
diplomatic efforts of foreign policy officials who would have liked to see a 
more active role of the United States. Not because it would have directly 
restricted or even forbidden their activity. But because Rwandan officials 
could be assured that, whatever some high-ranking U.S. official told him, it 
                                                 
34  Although the final version of the paper had been issued only one month into the 
genocide, the considerations encapsulated in the doctrine were around the corner in the 
weeks preceding its publication.  
71 
was improbable that the U.S. would interfere with Rwandan violence on a 
large scale. Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State 
Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, for example, had almost daily phone 
contact with Rwandan government officials. In those phone calls, she tried to 
set pressure upon those politicians and military leaders to stop the killings. 
She confronted them Rwandan officials with eyewitness accounts of the 
genocide and told them that their actions would not be unpunished. But the 
answers she got were cynicism and lies. Confronted with the mass killings 
that had occurred, Theoneste Bagosora, cabinet director in Rwanda’s Ministry 
of Defense and the coordinator of the genocide, told here that the massacres 
were organized by the RPF (United States. Department of State, April 29, 
1994). She later also recalls that when she announced to Augustin Bizimungu, 
the Rwandan military chief of staff, that President Clinton would hold him 
accountable for the killings, the former’s only answer was »Oh, how nice it is 
that your president is thinking of me« (quoted in Power, 2003, 370). The 
Rwandan officials knew that they had nothing to fear. There was a Rwandan 
embassy in the U.S. capital, and, by irony of fate, Rwanda at this time held 
one of the rotating seats in the Security Council. Both positions provided 
enough insights for the Rwandan representatives in Washington and New 
York to assure their government at home, that the U.S. government had 
committed itself to a strict non-intervention policy. 
Studies in strategic interaction have shown that one agent bringing forward a 
threat is not enough to influence the behavior of another agent. The 
compliance of this second agent to the demands of the first one will depend 
on whether or not the threat is backed by a credible commitment of the first 
agent to enforce its will and to punish the second agent in the case of non-
compliance (see for example Schelling, 1966, esp. chs. 1 and 2). The 
diplomatic efforts of Bushnell and other U.S. officials who undertook actions 
in order to stop the Rwandan killings were not backed by such a kind of 
commitment. On the contrary, with the publication of the Presidential  
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Decision Directive 25, the U.S. government had publicly committed itself not 
to intervene in a case like the Rwandan one. 
 
V.4. Awareness 
Beside from a general hesitance of the U.S.-American society in regard to 
peacekeeping operations and the policy commitments of the Clinton 
administration it generated, awareness – or more correctly: unawareness – to 
the Rwandan conflict was a central factor in the decision making on the issue. 
As it had already been outlined, prior the genocide, Rwanda did not constitute 
an “issue” – neither to the U.S.-American public, nor to its foreign policy 
officials. A glance at the newspapers shows this relative insignificance of the 
country. During the whole year before the genocide, the New York Times, the 
U.S. daily national newspaper with the most extensive international affairs 
coverage, published 19 pieces relating to Rwanda. The Washington Post, 
another national daily, printed as much as 8 articles mentioning the countries 
name. According to the problems described and the responsibilities suggested, 
the pieces can be classified into three categories: 
The majority of the articles relates to Rwanda as a genuine foreign issue, in 
which the American public is a mere observer. In the focus is the Rwandan 
civil war and the role of the country in the generally conflict torn region of the 
Great Lakes. There are two anchor points to the reporting. The first is the 
final stage of the Arusha peace-talks, motivating correspondents to shed some 
lights on the background of the conflict; Rwanda is portrayed as a country 
with a history of ethnically underpinned political violence.
35 The second 
anchor point of the reporting is the refugee problem that is created by the 
                                                 
35  See for example “Accord Ends 3-Year Civil War in Rwanda”, August 5, 1993; 
Lorch, July 8, 1993; “Clashes in Rwanda”, March 14, 1993.   
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persisting violence in the region.
36 The second cluster of articles and reports 
represents Rwanda as an issue on the United Nations’ agenda. In June and 
October, short messages occur on the occasion of the deployment of U.N. 
peacekeeping troops.
37 In November, the nomination of a U.N. special 
representative to Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh Booh from Cameroon, is 
worth a notice (“U.N. Names Rwanda Envoy”, November 13, 1993). The 
remaining small number of articles mentions Rwanda in the domestic policy 
context. In this domestic debate about new guidelines for foreign policy, the 
country sometimes serves as a prototypical example of the “new conflicts” the 
U.S. has to deal with — or not to deal with — in the post-Cold War era. In 
this context, the name of the unknown country even makes it to page one of 
national newspapers (Binder, Crossette, February 7, 1993; Lewis, October 10, 
1993; “U.S. Pays the U.N. $533 Million in Arrears”, October 7, 1993). 
When in April 1994, after the dead of the ten Belgian soldiers, the escalation 
of violence in Rwanda and the future of the UNAMIR force became an issue 
in the Security Council, the U.S. government had a strong interest in keeping 
the matter as low as possible. Therefore, in its guideline paper to the U.S.-
American representatives to the U.N., the State Department not only urged for 
a withdrawal of the troops but also expressed its conviction that this pull out 
should be the task of the Secretary General and would not necessitate a 
resolution of the Security Council. The Department was well aware of the fact 
that a formal decision of the Council would draw public attention to the 
Rwandan crisis and provoke international criticism of the U.S.-American 
position. The apprehension was well founded. While the resolution must be 
judged fatal with regard to the lives at stake in Rwanda, the decision and the 
preceding debate significantly pushed U.S. public attention to the conflict. To 
                                                 
36  See for example Lorch, July 8, 1993. 
37  See “U.N. Votes to Send a Force to Uganda-Rwanda Border”, June 3, 1993 on the 
deployment of a blue-helmet force commissioned to prevent arms smuggle between 
Uganda and Rwanda in order to prevent a further intensification of the civil war; and “U.N. 
Approves Troops for Rwanda”, October 6, 1993 on the deployment of a peacekeeping  
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different sets of players beforehand unaware of the events — journalists and 
editors as well as NGO activists or politicians — the vote in New York 
provided reason and incentive to direct their interest to the unknown country 
in eastern Africa.
38 Ironically, it was exactly the decision to not assist the 
people dying in the country that made the foreign public aware of what was 
going on there and raised voices calling for an intervention.
39 »For West, 
Rwanda is Not Worth the Political Candle« was to be read, for example, in a 
New York Times piece commenting on the Security Council resolution 
(Sciolino, April 15, 1994). With the vote in the Council and the controversial 
U.S. position in the preceding debate, Rwanda ceased to be a “foreign issue” 
to which the U.S. public was a mere observer. It now involved decision-
making of domestic politicians, creating some kind of U.S. stakeholdership in 
the conflict. This push in attention and, most of all, the change in perspective 
provided a chance. No promoter of a pro-active U.S. role in stopping 
Rwandan violence appeared. Thus, reporting never gained momentum, did 
not evolve into a veritable public debate. On April 21, 1993 the human rights 
activists Alison Des Forges and Monique Mujawamariya (the latter had just 
escaped the Rwandan massacres), in a meeting at the White House, asked 
Security Adviser Anthony Lake how they might alter U.S. policy, and he told 
them »If you want to make this move, you will have to change public opinion. 
You must make more noise« (Des Forges, 1999, 624-625). But in a hearing of 
the House’s Subcommittee on Africa, scheduled on May 4, 1994, they spoke 
to an almost empty auditory. Most of the Representatives had sent their 
assistants (United States Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Subcommittee on Africa, 1995).  
                                                                                                                                                    
force charged with overseeing the Arusha cease-fire agreement. 
38  A simple factor supporting this dynamic is that while only few medias entertain 
correspondents in the Great Lake Region, all major newspapers, radio stations and TV 
channels have political correspondents in New York. 
39  See for example “Cold Choices in Rwanda”, April 23, 1994, an editorial which 
became famous for being the first article published by a major American newspaper to call 
the Rwandan events a genocide; and “Aid Groups Assail U.N. Pullout in Rwanda”, April  
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The reaction of the U.S.-American government, Congress and other societal 
forces to the Rwandan genocide was not blind. It was not based on a lack of 
information or a general unawareness of the conflict. The political decisions 
were taken clear sighted and well informed. They were backed by foreign 
policy preferences of the U.S. public that told the agents in power that, having 
considered the nature of the Rwandan conflict, they must come to the 
conclusion that the U.S. has to stay out. 






Towards Bureaucratic Representation  
The Rwandan genocide and the failure of its foreign witnesses to stop it has 
become a symbol of the incapability of the international community, and 
especially of the United Nations, to protect the most basic of all human rights, 
the right to live. Journalists as well as researchers blamed the United Nations 
for its paralysation in the case (Barnett, 2002). Studying the proceedings and 
actions of the U.N. organs and some of its member countries in the Rwandan 
question, this reproach seems somehow surprising, since, from the beginning 
of the events, there has been considerable activity on the part of the 
international observers. The statement that the ›international public‹ did 
nothing does not seem to hold. The disturbing conclusion that has to be drawn 
from the analysis of the reactions is that of the measures proposed and the 
actions undertaken none did respond to the core of the Rwandan violence 
which was the attempt of an extremist regime threatened by political change 
to save its power by initiating large scale massacres against a minority group 
– in short: a genocide. But for months, not the genocide, but a civil war was 
represented as the central Rwandan problem. Reactions did not respond to the 
massacres but to an overwhelming refugee wave streaming into Rwanda’s 
neighboring countries. And, in fact, this situation did not substantially change  
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after the end of the genocide, since, while it might be true that the Rwandan 
killings have triggered the interest of a number of journalists and social 
scientists, the institutional attention is not with the survivors of the genocide. 
Still in 1995, the human rights organisation African Rights complained that 
still considerable amounts of money and resources flew into the refugee 
camps in the neighboring countries which were largely populated by former 
executers and collaborators of the genocide, while the victims of the violence 
within the country are being forgotten (African Rights, 1995, xxix). 
Government documents and testimonies of foreign policy officials rule out 
that those outwardly badly conceived reactions of the United States and other 
U.N. member countries to the Rwandan genocide were not due to a lack of 
information; they also proof that officials were well aware of the fact that a 
third-party intervention was the only means to stop these massacres. But if it 
was not ignorance or miscalculation, how can the misguided international 
reaction to the Rwandan genocide be explained. 
I suggest that, beside from personal failure that is not the subject of my study, 
a structural feature of the international political system is a major factor 
behind the representation and decision-making pattern in the Rwandan case. 
The two focal points of foreign action — dealing with the refugees and 
mediating between the civil war parties — have one thing in common. Both 
problems are not new, and since the end World War II, dealing with them has 
become a frequent practice. In consequence, highly specialized national and 
international agencies as the UNHCR evolved with professional and 
experienced staff. Over time, organisational routines developed in dealing 
with certain issues. It is common sense that the risk of an action declines with 
the degree of experience in executing this action. In the social realm, 
experiences can transcend the individual as they become embedded in 
institutions and organisational processes. In this sense, the existence of 
organisational routines and of specialized bureaucratic agencies discharges  
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political decision-making, because they make it easier to delegate problems, 
since responsibilities are easy to assign with a relative stable expectation 
about the quality of the outcome, they create stakeholdership for a problem 
that is insensible to the consequences of preference changes in a 
representative system and sometimes they might even reduce the need for 
political decision making.
40 The political risk involved in dealing with issues 
for which organisational routines or specialized agencies exist, are lower than 
if dealing with an issue that has never occurred before. 
When the Rwandan refugees streamed into Rwanda’s neighboring countries, 
the UNHCR immediately took up the lead for organizing the set up of refugee 
camps. When the RPF started to fight the Rwandan Army, U.S. officials 
could resort to several cases in which U.S. governments had involved in 
foreign civil wars. But in response to the pictures of the mutilated bodies 
floating into Lake Victoria, no such easy resort was available. 
The analysis of the U.S. reaction to the Rwandan genocide has outlined the 
constitutional and historical conditions which prevented U.S. support for an 
intervention mission. But the general findings are applicable not only to the 
United States but to all popular representative systems. Since on the one hand 
foreign involvement always has domestic opportunity costs, but on the other, 
governments in democracies depend upon the support of their constituents 
which in most cases will assign higher importance to domestic than to foreign 
issues, active support of an intervention mission – not only in words but in 
deeds – will be an exceptional case. In consequence, it is more than unlikely 
that there will ever be a case in which the cumulated preferences of the states 
represented in the U.N. Security Council will lead to a quick and determinate 
intervention to stop genocide. The findings of this paper suggest that if the 
community of U.N. member states had the intention of preventing »another 
Rwanda«, »another Bosnia«, »another Auschwitz«, the only effective 
                                                 
40  It goes without saying that those features of bureaucratic organisations are not  
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measure to implement this goal would be to create powerful institutional 
stakeholdership for the issue of genocide, i.e. some kind of agency monitoring 
conflicts and authorized to certain actions, within the organisation of the 
United Nations itself. 
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